G.R. No. L-64279 April 30, 1984

GR No. L-64 279 April 30, 1984
L. ANSELMO Pesigan and MARCELINO L. Pesigan, petitioners,
vs.
DOMINGO MEDINA JUDGE ANGELES, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City Branch 129, Regional Trial Court for acting of Camarines Norte, now presided over by JUDGE Nicanor Orino, Daet Branch 40; DRA. BELLA MIRANDA S., V. ARNULFO ZENAROSA, ET AL., Respondents.
Quiazon, De Guzman Makalintal and Barot for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

AQUINO, J .:
And issue in this case is the enforceability, before publication in the Official Gazette of June 14, 1982, of Presidential Executive Order No. 626-A dated October 25, 1980,-providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to another.
Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia, Batangas, as the destination .
They were provided with (1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Sur, issued under the Revised Administrative Code and Presidential Decree No. 533, the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974; (2) a permit to transport large cattle issued under the authority of the provincial commander; and (3) three certificates of inspection, one from the Constabulary command attesting that the carabaos were not included in the list of lost, stolen and questionable animals; one from the livestock inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry of Libmanan, Camarines Sur and one from the mayor of Sipocot.
In Spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates, the carabaos, while passing and Basud, Camarines Norte, were confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the town's police station commander, and by Doctor Bella S. Miranda, provincial veterinarian. The confiscation was the basis on the aforementioned Executive Order No. Which provides 626-A "that henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. Carabeef The carabaos or transported in violation of this Executive Order shall be amended as subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be distributed ... to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry has see fit, in the case of carabaos "(78 OG 3144).
Doctor Miranda distributed the carabaos our twenty-five farmers of Basud, and to a farmer from the municipal nursery Vinzons (Annex 1).
The Pesigans filed against Doctor Miranda Zenarosa and an action for replevin for the recovery of the carabaos allegedly valued and P70,000 and damages of P92,000. The replevin order could not be executed by the sheriff. In His order of April 25, 1983 Judge Domingo Medina Angeles, who heard the case and Daet and who was later transferred to Caloocan City, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
The Pesigans appealed to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and Section 25 of the Interim Rules and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440, a 1968 law superseded Which Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
We hold that the said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 Because, as already noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982 It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The word "laws" in Article 2 (Article 1 of the old Civil Code) Which Includes circulars and regulations prescribe penalties. Publication is Necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. (People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Lim Hoa Ting vs. Central Bank of the Phils., 104 Phil. 573; Balbuna vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150)
The Spanish Supreme Court ruled that "bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, comprenden tambien se los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares ordenes dictadas Reales y con las de conformidad mismas public office por el en de su potestad trends (1 Manresa, Código Civil, 7th Ed., p. 146.)
ThuS, Que Po Lay in the case, a person, convicted by the trial court of having violated the Central Bank Circular No. 20 and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P1000, was acquitted by this Court Because the circular was published in the Official Gazette three days after His conviction. He was not bound by the circular.
That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A Because its confiscation and forfeiture provisions or sanctions makes it a penal statute. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by Means of publication in the Gazette before violators of the executive order can be bound thereby.
The cases of Police Commission vs. Bello, L-29 960, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 230 and Philippine Blooming Mills vs. Social Security System, 124 Phil. 499, cited by the respondents, do not involve the enforcement of any penal regulation.
Commonwealth Act No. 638 Requires that all Presidential executive orders having general applicability shouldnt be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that "every document or order prescribe a penalty Shag Which shall be deemed to have general applicability and legal effect."
Indeed, the practice has always been to publish executive orders in the Gazette. Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that Even bureau "regulations and orders shall Become effective only when approved by the Department Head and published in the Official Gazette or Otherwise publicly promulgated". (See Commissioner of Civil Service vs. Cruz, 122 Phil. 1015.)
In the instant case, the livestock inspector and the provincial veterinarian of Camarines Norte and the head of the Public Affairs Office of the Ministry of Agriculture were unaware of Executive Order No. 626-A. The Pesigans could not have been expected to be cognizant of Such an executive order.
It results that They have a cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The summary confiscation was not in order. The recipients of the carabaos shouldnt Them Return to the Pesigans. However, They can not transport the carabaos to Batangas Because They are now bound by the said executive order. Neither They can recover damages. Doctor Miranda and Zenarosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.
Wherefore, the trial court's order of dismissal and the confiscation and dispersal of the carabaos are reversed and set aside. Miranda and Zenarosa respondents are ordered to restore the carabaos, with the requisite documents, to the petitioners, as owners who are entitled to possess the same, with the right to dispose of them in Basud or Sipocot, Camarines Sur. No costs.
SO ordered.
Makasiar, (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, and Escolin, JJ., Concur.
De Castro, J., took no part.


Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
The Pesigans are entitled to the return of their carabaos or the value of dmg each carabao Which is not returned for any reason. The Pesigans are also entitled to a reasonable rental for dmg each carabao from the twenty six farmers who used them. The farmers should not enrich themselves at the expense of the Pesigans.


Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
The Pesigans are entitled to the return of their carabaos or the value of dmg each carabao Which is not returned for any reason. The Pesigans are also entitled to a reasonable rental for dmg each carabao from the twenty six farmers who used them. The farmers should not enrich themselves at the expense of the Pesigans.

G.R. No. L-18208 February 14, 1922

GR No. L-18 208 December 14, 1922
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICENTE DIAZ DE CONDE and APOLINARIA R. CONDE, defendants-appellants.
Araneta & Zaragoza for appellants.
Attorney-General Villareal for appellee.
JOHNSON, J .:
It Appears from the record that on the 6th day of May, 1921, a complaint was Presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, charging the defendants with a violation of the Usury Law (Act No. 2655). They were upon said complaint dmg each Arrested, arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. The cause was finally brought on for trial on the 1st day of September, 1921 and the close of the trial, and after a consideration of the evidence adduced, the Honorable MV del Rosario, judge, found that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged in the complaint and sentenced dmg each of them to pay a fine of P120 and, in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of the law. From that sentence dmg each of the defendants appealed to this court.
The appellants now Contend: (a) That the contract upon Which the alleged usurious interest was Collected was executed before Act No. 2655 was adopted; (B) that at the time said contract was made (December 30, 1915), there was no Usury law in force in the Philippine Islands; (C) that said Act No. 2655 Did not Become effective until the 1st day of May, 1916, or four months and a half after the contract in question was executed; (D) that said the law could have no retroactive effect or operation, and (e) that said the law impairs the obligation of a contract, and that all of said Reasons for the judgment imposed by the lower court shouldnt be revoked; that the complaint be dismissed shouldnt, and that shouldnt They dmg each be discharged from the custody of the law.
The essential facts constituting the basis of the criminal action are not in dispute, and there be Stated as Follows: (1) That on the 30th day of December, 1915, the alleged offended persons Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Lianco executed and delivered to the defendants a contract (Exhibit B) evidencing the fact that the former had borrowed from the latter the sum of P300, and (2) that, by virtue of the terms of said contract, the said Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Lianco obligated themselves to pay to the defendants interest and the rate of five per cent (5%) per month, payable Within the first ten days of dmg each and every month, the first payment to be made on the 10th day of January, 1916 There were other terms in the contract Which, however, are not important for the decision in the present case.
The lower court, in the course of its opinion, Stated that at the time of the execution and delivery of said contract (Exhibit B), there was no law in force in the Philippine Islands punishing Usury; but, inasmuch as the defendants had Collected a usurious rate of interest after the adoption of the Usury Law in the Philippine Islands (Act No. 2655), They were found guilty of a violation of that law and be punished in shouldnt accordance with its provisions.
The law, we think, is that when a well Established contract Contains an obligation to pay interest upon the principal, the interest thereby becomes part of the principal and is included Within the promise to pay. In other words, the obligation to pay interest on money due under a contract, express or implied it be, is a part of the obligation of the contract. Laws adopted after the execution of a contract, changing or altering the rate of interest, can not be made to apply to Such contract without violating the provisions of the constitution Which prohibit the adoption of a law "impairing the obligation of contracts." (8 Cyc., 996, 12 Corpus Juris, 1058-1059.)
The obligation of the contract is the law Which binds the parties to perform their agreement if it is not contrary to the law of the land, Morals or public order. That law must Govern and control the contract in every aspect in Which it is intended to bear upon it, whether it Affect its validity, construction, or discharge. Any law Which enlarges, abridges, or in any MANNER changes the intention of the parties, necessarily impairs the contract itself. If a law impairs the obligation of a contract, it is prohibited by the Jones Law, and is null and void. The laws in force in the Philippine Islands prior to any legislation by the American sovereignty, prohibited the Legislature from giving to any penal law retroactive effect unless Such a law was favorable to the accused person. (Articles 21 and 22, Penal Code.)
A new law imposing a penalty, or a new liability or disability, or giving a new right of action, must not be construed as having a retroactive effect. It is an elementary rule of contract that the laws in force at the time the contract was made must Govern its interpretation and application. Laws must be construed prospectively and not retrospectively. If a contract is legal at its inception, it can not be rendered unlawful by any subsequent legislation. If that were permitted then the obligations of a contract Might be impaired, Which is prohibited by the organic law of the Philippine Islands. (US vs. Constantino Quingco Chua Tan, 39 Phil., 552; Aguilar and Gonzales vs. Rubiato Vila, 40 Phil., 570.)
Ex post facto laws, unless They are favorable to the defendant, are prohibited in this jurisdiction. Every law that makes an action, done before the passage of the law, and Which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes Such action, is an ex post facto law. In the present case Act No. Which made 2655 an act had been done before the law was adopted, a criminal act, and to make said Act applicable to the act complained of would be to give it an ex post facto operation. The Legislature is prohibited from adopting a law Which will make an act done before its adoption a crime. A law with retroactive effect be given in a civil action,-providing it is curative in character, but ex post facto laws are absolutely prohibited unless its retroactive effect is favorable to the defendant.
For the reason, Therefore, that the acts complained of in the present case were legal at the time of their occurrence, They can not be made by any subsequent criminal or ex post facto legislation. What the courts have to say, considering the provisions of article 1255 of the Civil Code, when a civil action is brought upon said contract, can not now be determined. A contract has be annulled by the courts when it is Shown that it is against public order or Morals.
For all of the foregoing Reasons, we are of the opinion, and so decide, that the acts complained of by the defendants did not constitute a crime at the time They were committed, and Therefore the sentence of the lower court shouldnt be, and is hereby, revoked; and it is hereby ordered and decreed that the complaint be dismissed, and that the defendants be discharged from the custody of the law, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972

GR nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in His capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch I), FELICIANO Leoncio CO CO alias alias "Bob," and NILO S. Tayag alias Romy Reyes alias "Fat," respondents.
Solicitor for the respondent Feliciano R. Mutuc Co.
Jose W. Diokno for respondent Nilo Tayag.

CASTRO, J.: p
I. Statement of the Case
Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion
Act 1 Which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other "subversive associations," and punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member" of the Party or of any other similar " subversive "organizations.
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of Section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against the respondent Feliciano Co. in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. On March 10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co, the Government directed prosecutors to file the corresponding information. The twice-amended information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27, recites:
That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and Within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, feloniously became an officer and / or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the Philippines by Means of force, violence, Deceit, subversion, or any other illegal Means for the purpose of Establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government under the control and domination of an alien power, by being an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of recruits of the New People's Army, the military arm of the said Communist Party of the Philippines.
That in the commission of the above offense, the User is following aggravating the circumstances are present, to wit:
(A) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with insult to public authorities;
(B) That the crime was committed by a band; and afford impunity.
(C) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.
Meanwhile, on: May 25, 1970, a criminal complaint was filed another with the same court, sharing the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. After preliminary investigation was had, an information was filed, Which, as amended, reads:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and State Prosecutors duly designated by the Secretary of Justice to collaborate with the Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac, pursuant to the Order dated June 5, above entitled case, hereby accuse Nilo S. Tayag, Romy Reyes alias alias TABA, ARTHUR GARCIA, RENATO (REY) CASIPE, ABELARDO GARCIA, MANUEL ALAVADO, BENJAMIN BIE Several aliases and MELODY COMMANDER JOHN DOES, whose identities are still unknown, for violation of Republic Act No. 1700, Otherwise Known as the Anti-Subversion Law, committed as Follows:
That in or about March 1969 and for sometime prior thereto and thereafter, in the Province of Tarlac, Within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and elsewhere in the Philippines, the above-named accused knowingly, willfully and by overt acts organized, joined and / or remained as offices and / or ranking leaders, of the YOUTH nationalist, a subversive organization as defined in Republic Act No. 1700; that BENJAMIN BIE and COMMANDER MELODY, in addition thereto, knowingly, willfully and by over acts joined and / or remained as a member and became an officer and / or ranking leader not only of the Communist Party of the Philippines but also of the New People's Army, the military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines; and that all the above-named accused, as such officers and / or ranking leaders of the aforestated subversive organizations, conspiring, confederating and mutually Helping one another, did then and there knowingly, willfully and feloniously commit subversive and / or Seditious acts, by inciting, instigating and stirring the people to unite and rise publicly and tumultuously and take up arms against the government, and / or Engage in rebellious conspiracies and riots to overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines by force, violence, Deceit, subversion and / boss or other illegal Means Which are the User is following:
1 On Several occasions Within the province of Tarlac, the accused conducted meetings and / or seminars wherein the said accused delivered speeches instigating and inciting the people to unite, rise in arms and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, by force, violence, Deceit, subversion and / or other illegal Means; and Toward this end, the said accused organized, our others a chapter of the YOUTH patriotic in Motrico village, La Paz, Tarlac for the avowed purpose of undertaking or Promoting an armed revolution, subversive and / or Seditious propaganda, conspiracies, and / or riots and / or other illegal Means to discredit and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and to Established in the Philippines a Communist regime.
2 The accused NILO Tayag ROMY REYES alias alias TABA, together with PORTEM FRANCISCO alias KIKO Gonzales and others, pursued the above subversive and / or Seditious activities in San Pablo City by recruiting members for the New People's Army, and / or by instigating and inciting the people to organize and unite for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines through armed revolution, Deceit, subversion and / or other illegal Means, and in the Philippines Establishing a Communist Government.
The User is following aggravating the circumstances that attended the commission of the offense: (a) the aid of armed men or persons to insure or afford impunity; and (b) craft, fraud, or disguise was employed.
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denied him the equal protection of the laws.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of September 15, 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overboard, and dismissed the informations against the two accused. The Government appealed. We Resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action for certiorari.
II. Is the Act a bill of attainder?
Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex port facto law shall be enacted." 2A bill of attainder is a legislative act Which inflicts punishment without trial. 3 Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. 4 The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to implemented the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to 5
rule-making 6 and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. 7 History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political minorities, 8 and it is against this evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatizea statute as a bill of attainder. 9
In the case and bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a quo as a bill of attainder Because it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a "continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country; its existence, a "clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines. '" By Means of the Act, the trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy by Pronouncing the guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or safeguards of judicial trial. " Finally, shown at the trial court, "if the only issue [to be determined] is whether or not the accused is a knowing and voluntary members, the law is still a bill of attainder Because it has expressly created a presumption of guilt Which organizational the accused can never hope to overthrow. "
1 When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, Stated in section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" issued solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct. 10
This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of the Federal Labor-US Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 11 Which, in US vs. Brown, 12 was held to be a bill of attainder and Therefore unconstitutional. Section 504 provided in its pertinent parts as Follows:
(A) No person who is or has been a member of the Communist
Party ... shall serve -
(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or similar governing body, business agent, manager, organizer, or other employee (other than as an employee performing exclusively clerical or custodial duties) of any labor organization.
During or for five years after the termination of His membership in the Communist Party ....
(B) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be fined not more than $ 10,000 or Imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
This statute specified the Communist Party, and disability and imposes penalties on its members. Membership in the party, without more, ipso facto disqualifies a person from Becoming an officer or a member of the governing body of any labor organization. As the Supreme Court of the United States pointed out:
Under the line of cases just outlined, sec. 504 of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress undoubtedly possesses power under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation designed to keep from positions affecting interstate commerce persons who have use of Such positions to bring about political strikes. In section 504, however, Congress has exceeded the authority granted it by the Constitution. The statute does not set forth a Generally applicable rule decreeing that any person who commits acts or possesses Certain Certain characteristics (acts and characteristics Which, in Congress' view, make Them likely to initiate political strikes) shall not hold union office, and leaves to courts and juries the job of deciding what persons have committed the specified acts or PossesseD the specified characteristics. Instead, it designates in no uncertain terms the persons who possess the feared characteristics and Therefore can not hold union office without incurring criminal liability - members of the Communist Party.
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 US 1, 6 L Ed 2d 625, 81 S CT 1357, LEND a support to our conclusions. That case involved an appeal from an order by the Control Board ordering the Communist Party to register as a "Communist-action organization," under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat 987, 50 USC sec. 781 et seq. (1958 ed). The definition of "Communist-action organization" Which the Board is to apply is set forth in sec. 3 of the Act:
[A] ny organization in the United States ... which (i) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this title, and (ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives of world Communist movement ... Such 64 Stat 989, 50 USC sec. 782 (1958 ed.)
A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act was a bill of attainder, reasoning that Sec. 3 does not specify the persons or groups upon Which the deprivations setforth in the Act are to be imposed, but instead sets forth a general definition. Although the Board has Determined in 1953 that the Communist Party was a "Communist-action organization," the Court found the statutory definition not to be so narrow as to insure that the party would always come Within it:
In this proceeding the Board had found, and the Court of Appeals has sustained its conclusions, that the Communist Party, by virtud of the activities in Which it now engages, comes Within the terms of the Act. If the Party shouldnt and anytime Choose to abandon these activities, after it is once registered pursuant to sec. 7, the Act provides adequate Means of relief. (US 367, and 87, and 6 L Ed 2d 683)
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially Established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that They joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to Further its basic objective, ie, to overthrow the existing Government by force Deceit, and other illegal Means and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign power.
As to the claim that under the statute organizationl imputed guilt is nonetheless despite the requirement of proof of knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to say that is precisely the nature of conspiracy, Which has been referred to as a "dragneet device" whereby all Participate in the criminals who are liable covenant. The contention would be correct if the statute were construed as punishing mere membership devoid of any specific intent to Further the unlawful goals of the Party. 13 But the statute specifically required that membership must be knowing or active, with specific intent to Further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what section 4 Means that when it Requires membership, to be unlawful, must be Shown to have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." 14 The ingredient of specific intent to Pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be Shown by "overt acts." 15 This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former Requires proof of direct participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while the latter Requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's illegal objectives.
2 Even assuming, however, the Act specifies that individuals and not activities, this feature is not enough to render it a bill of attainder. A statute prohibiting partners or employees of securities underwriting firms from serving as officers or employees of national banks on the basis of a legislative finding that the persons mentioned would be subject to the temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to the national economy, has not been declared to be a bill of attainder. 16 Similarly, a statute requiring every secret, oath-bound society having a membership of and least twenty to register, and punishing any person who becomes a member of society Such Which fails to register or remains a member thereof, was declared valid Even if in Shown its operation it was to apply only to the members of the Ku Klux Klan. 17
In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace Act, 18 requiring labor unions to file with the Department of Labor affidavits of union officers "to the effect that They are not members of the Communist Party and that They are not Which members of any organization teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method, "was upheld by this Court. 19
Indeed, it is only when a statute applies to named individuals or Either to Easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial Does it Become a bill of attainder. 20 It is upon this ground that the statutes Which disqualified those who had taken part in the rebellion against the Government of the United States During the Civil War from holding office, 21 or from exercising their profession, 22 or Which prohibited the payment of compensation to Further individuals named in the Act on the basis of a finding that They had engages in subversive activities, 23 or Which made it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer or employee of a labor union, 24 have been invalidated as bills of attainder.
But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be Certain as to be "judicially noticeable," the legislature has applied its own rules, and judicial hearing is not needed to make fairly Such determination. 25
In New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman, 26 the New York legislature passed a law requiring every secret, oath-bound society with a membership of and least twenty to register, and punishing any person who joined or remained a member of such a society Failing to register. While the statute did not specify the Ku Klux Klan, in its operation the law applied to the KKK exclusively. In Sustaining the statute against the claim that it discriminated against the Ku Klux Klan while exempting other secret, oath-bound societies and Masonic organizations like the Knights of Columbus, the United States Supreme Court relied on common knowledge of the nature and activities of the Ku Klux Klan. The Court said:
The courts below recognized the principle Shown in the cases just cited and Reached the conclusions that the classification was justified by a difference Between the two classes of associations Shown by experience, and that the difference consisted (a) in a manifest tendency on the part of one class to make the secrecy surrounding its purpose and membership a cloak for acts and conduct inimical to personal rights and public welfare, and (b) in the absence of such a tendency on the part of the other class. In pointing out this difference one of the courts said the Ku Klux Klan of, the principal association in the class included: "It is a matter of common knowledge that this organization functions largely at night, its members disguised by hoods and gowns and doing things calculated to strike terror into the minds of the people; " and later said of the other class: "These organizations and their purposes are well Known, many of them having been in existence for many years. Many of them are oath-bound and secret. But we hear no complaint against Them Regarding violation of the peace or interfering with the rights of others. " Another of the courts, said: "It is a matter of common knowledge that the association or organization of the relator Which is concededly a member exercises activities tending to the prejudice and intimidation of sundry classes of our citizens. But the legislation is not confined to this society; " and later said of the other class: "Labor unions have a recognized lawful purpose. The benevolent orders mentioned in the Benevolent Orders Law have already received legislative scrutiny and have been granted special privileges so that the legislature has well consider in Them beneficial rather than harmful agencies . " The third court, after recognizing "the potentialities of evil in secret societies," and observing that "the danger of Certain organizations judicially has been demonstrated," - meaning in that state, - said: "Benevolent orders, labor unions and college fraternities have existed for many years, and, while not immune from hostile criticism, have on the whole justified their existence. "
We be assuming that the legislature had before it Such information as was readily available including the published report of a hearing, before a committee of the House of Representatives of the 57th Congress relating to the formation, purposes and activities of the Klu Klux Klan. If so it was advised - putting aside controverted evidence - that the order was a revival of the Ku Klux Klan of an earlier time with Additional features borrowed from the Know Nothing and the APA orders of other periods; that its memberships was limited to native-born, Gentile, protestant whites; that in part of its constitution and printed creed it proclaimed the widest freedom for all and full adherence to the Constitution of the United States; in another exacted of its members an oath to shield and preserve "white supremacy;" and in still another declared any person actively opposing its principles to be "a dangerous ingredient in the Body Politic of our country and an enemy to the weal of our national commonwealth;" that it was conducting a crusade against Catholics, Jews, and Negroes, and stimulating hurtful religious and race prejudices; that it was striving for political power and assuming a sort of guardianship over the administration of local, state and national affairs; and that at times it was taking into its own hands the punishment of what some of its members conceived to be crimes. 27
In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the object of continuing scrutiny by this Court. In 1932 we found the Communist Party of the Philippines to be an illegal association. 28 In 1969 we again found that the objective of the party was the "overthrow of the Philippine Government by armed struggle and to establish in the Philippines a communist form of government similar to that of Soviet Russia and Red China." 29 More recently, in Lansang vs. Garcia, 30 we noted the growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the organization of our youth Communist fronts Such organizations as the Young Patriot (KM) and the emergence of the New People's Army. After meticulously Reviewing the evidence, we said: "We entertain, Therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have been and still are thuS engaged in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.
3 Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it has fall Within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also Necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. This requirement Follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt. As Justice Frankfurter Observed, "frequently a bill of attainder was ... doubly objectionable Because of its ex post factofeatures. This is the historic explanation for uniting the two mischiefs in one
clause - "No bill of attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed. ' ... Therefore, if [a statute] is a bill of attainder it is also an ex post facto law. But if it is not an ex post facto law, the Reasons that establish that it is not are persuasive that it can not be a bill of attainder. "31
ThuS in Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32 the US Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Charter of the City of Los Angeles Which provided:
... [N] or person shall hold or retain or be eligible for any public office or employment in the service of the City of Los Angeles, in any office or department thereof, elective or appointive Either, who has Within five (5) years prior to the effective date of this section advised, advocated, or taught, or who have, after this section becomes effective, Become a member of or affiliated with any group, society, association, organization or party Which advises, advocates or teaches or Within has said period of five (5) years advised, advocated, or taught the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States of America or of the State of California.
In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective application of the Act to the petitioner therein, thuS:
Immaterial here is ... we MIGHT have any opinion as to the charter provision insofar as it purported to apply restrospectively for a five-year period to its effective date. We be assuming that under the Federal Constitution, the Charter Amendment is valid to the extent that it bars from the city's public service persons who, subsequently to its adoption in 1941, advise, advocate, or reach the violent overthrow of the Government or who are or Become affiliated with any group doing so. The provisions were prospectively operating thuS a reasonable regulation to protected the municipal service by Establishing an employment qualification of loyalty to the State and the United States.
Unlike the ... provisions of the charter and ordinance under Which petitioners were removed, the statute in the Lovett case did not declare general and prospectively operative standards of qualification and eligibility for public employment. Rather, by its terms it prohibited the payment of any Further compensationto named individuals or employees. Under these the circumstances, viewed against the legislative background, the statutewas held to have imposed penalties without judicial trial.
Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is thatCongress thereby assumed judicial magistracy, it mustbe Them demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill of attainderreaches past conduct and that the penalties it imposesare inescapable. As the US Supreme Court observedwith respect to the US Federal Subversive Activities ControlAct of 1950:
Nor is the statute made an act of "outlawry" or of attainderby the fact that the conduct it regulates Which is describedwith Such particularity that, in probability, few come organizationswill Within the statutory terms. Legislatures have tocurb Behaviour Act Which They regard as harmful to the public welfare, whether that conduct is found to be engaged in by manypersons or by one. So long as the incidence of legislation issuch that the persons who Engage in the regulated conduct, bethey many or few, can escape regulation merely by altering thecourse of their own present activities, there can be no complaintof an attainder. 33
This statement, mutatis mutandis, with be said of theAnti-Subversion Act. Section 4 thereof expressly therein statesthat the prohibition applies only to acts committed "After the approval of this Act." Only those who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with, Become or remain members of the Communist Party of thePhilippines and / or its successors or of any subversive association" after June 20, 1957, are punished. Those whowere members of the Party or of any other subversive associationat the time of the enactment of the law, weregiven the opportunity of purging themselves of liability byrenouncing in writing and under oath their membershipin the Party. The law expressly provides that renunciationshall Such Such operate to exempt persons from penalliability. 34 The penalties prescribed by the Act are thereforenot inescapable.
III. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process
1 As already Stated, the legislative declaration in section 2 of the Act that the Communist Party of the Philippinesis an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of theGovernment is not inteded to provide the basis for a legislativefinding of guilt of the members of the Party butrather to Justify the proscription spelled out in section 4 Freedom of expression and freedom of association are that sofundamental They are thought by some to occupy a "preferred position" in the hierarchy of constitutional values. 35 Accordingly, any limitation on their exercise mustbe justified by the existence of a substantive evil. This isthe reason why before enacting the statute in question Congressconducted careful investigations and then Stated itsfindings in the preamble, thuS:
... [T] he Communist Party of the Philippines althoughpurportedly a political party, is in fact an organized conspiracyto overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippinesnot only by force and violence but also by Deceit, subversionand other illegal Means, for the purpose of Establishing a totalitarian regime in thePhilippines subject to alien dominationand control;
... [T] he continued existence and activities of the CommunistParty of the Philippines constitutes a clear, present danger to the security andgrave of the Philippines;
... [I] n the face of the organized, systematice and persistentsubversion, national in scope but international in direction, posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its activities, there is urgent need for special legislation to cope withthis continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country.
In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be opento question if, instead of making these findings in enactingthe statute, Congress omitted to do so.
In saying that by Means of the Act Congress has assumed judicial magistracy, the trial failed to takeproper courd account of the Distinction Between legislative fact and adjudicative fact. Professor Paul Freund elucidatesthe crucial distinction, thuS:
A law forbidding ... the sale of beverages containingmore than 3.2 per cent of alcohol would raise a question of legislativefact, ie, whether this standard has a reasonable relationto public health, Morals, and the enforcement problem. Alaw forbidding the sale of Intoxicating beverages (assuming itis not so vague as to require supplementation by rule-making) would raise a question of adjudicative fact, ie, whether thisor that is Intoxicating beverages Within the meaning of the statuteand the limits on governmental action imposed by the Constitution. Of course what we mean by dmg each case is in fact itselfan Founded ultimate conclusions on the underlying facts and weighing oncriteria of judgment for them.
A conventional formulation is that legislative facts - those facts Which are Relevant to the legislative judgment - will not be canvassed to determine whether saving there is a rationalbasis They exist for believing that, while adjudicativefacts - those Which tie the legislative enactment to the litigant - are demonstrated and found to be shown at the ordinarystandards prevailing for judicial trials. 36
The test formulated in nebbia vs. New York, 37 andadopted by this Court in Lansang vs. Garcia, 38 is that "if laws are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are Neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio." The recital of legislative findings implements this test.
With respect to a similar statement of legislative findingsin the Subversive Activities Control US Federal Actof 1950 (that "Communist-action organizations" are controlledby the foreign government controlling the movement and that worldCommunist They operate primarily to "advance the objectives of world Communist movement Such" ), the US Supreme Court said:
It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of theselegislative findings and rejected them .... They are the productof extensive investigation by Committes of Congress over morethan a decade and a half. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 US502, 516, 530 We certainly can not dismiss Them as unfoundedirrational imaginings. And if we accept ... Them, as we mustas not unentertainable appraisal by a Congress of the Communist threatwhich organizations pose not only to existing governmentin the United States, but to the United States as asovereign, independent Nation. Recognized that ... we must thepower of Congress to regulate Communist organizations of thisnature is
extensive. 39
This statement, mutatis mutandis, with thelegislative be said of the findings articulated in the Anti-Subversion Act.
That the Government has a right to protected againstsubversion itself is a proposition too plain to require elaboration.Self-preservation is the "ultimate value" of society. It surpasses every other transcendes and value, "a society can not forif protected from its very structure armedinternal attack, ... no subordinate value can be protected" 40 As Chief Justice Vinson so aptly said in Dennis vs. United States: 41
Whatever theoretical merit there has be to the argumentthat there is a 'right' to rebellion against dictatorial governmentsis without force where the existing structure of government provides for peaceful and orderly change. We rejectany principle of governmental helplessness in the face of preparationfor revolution, Which principle, carried to its logical conclusions, must lead to anarchy. No one could conceive that it isnot Within the power of Congress to prohibit acts intended tooverthrow the government by force and violence.
2 By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as explicitly described in sectin 4 thereof), Congressreaffirmed its respect for the rule that "Even throughthe governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose can not be pursued by Means that broadly stiflefundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. " 42 The requirement of knowing membership, as distinguished from nominalmembership, hasbeen held as a sufficient basis for penalizing membershipin a subversive organization. 43 For, as has been Stated:
Membership in an organization renders aid and encouragement to the organization; and when membership is acceptedor retained with knowledge that the organization is engaged inan unlawful purpose, the one accepting or retaining membershipwith Such knowledge makes himself a party to the unlawfulenterprise in Which it is engaged. 44
3 The argument that the Act is unconstitutionallyoverbroad Because section 2 merely speaks of "overthrow" of the Government and overthrow have be achieved by peaceful Means, misconceives the function of the phrase "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts" in section 4 Section 2 is merely a legislative declaration; the definitionsof and the penalties prescribed for the same acts prescribedare Stated in section 4 membershipin Which Requires that the Communist Party of the Philippines, to be unlawful, must be acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." Indeed, the first "whereas" clause makes clear thatthe overthrow contemplated is "overthrow not only violence but also by forceand be Deceit, subversion and other illegalmeans." The absence of this qualificatio in section 2 appearsto be due more to an oversight rather than to deliberateomission.
Moreover, the word "overthrow" sufficiently connotesthe use of violent and other illegal Means. Only in a metaphoricalsense with one speak of peaceful overthrow ofgovernments, and certainly the law does not speak in metaphors.In the case of the Anti-Subversion Act, the use ofthe word "overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is hardlyconsistent with the clearly delineated objective of the "overthrow," namely, "in the Philippines Establishing a totalitarianregime and place [sic] the Government under thecontrol and domination of an alien power." What thisCourt once said in a prosecution for sedition is appropos: "The language used by the appellant clearly imported anoverthrow of the Government by violence, and it shouldnt beinterpreted in the plain and obvious sense in Which it wasevidently intended to be understood. The word 'overthrow'could not have been intended as an ordinarychange by referring to the exercise of the elective franchise. The useof the whip [Which accused exhorted the audience to His useagainst the Constabulary], an instrument designed toleave marks on the sides of adversaries, the mild interpretation is inconsistentwith Which the appellant wouldhave us impute to the language. "45
IV. The Act and the Guaranty of Free Expression
As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the Government by force, violence orother Means illegal. Whatever interest in freedom of speechand freedom of association is infringed by the prohibitionagainst knowing membership in the Communist Party ofthe Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to beclearly and heavily outweighed by the overriding national security and the considerationsof preservartion of democraticinstitutions in His country.
The membership clause of the US Federal Smith Actis similar in many respects to the membership provisions of the Anti-Subversion Act. The former provides:
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, or encouraged the overthrow or destruction of any government by force or Such violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliated with, any Such society, group or assembly of persons, knowing the purpose thereof -
Shall be fined not more than $ 20,000 or Imprisoned not more than twenty years, or Both, and shall be ineligible for employment by the United States or any department or agency thereof, for the five years next User is following His conviction ....
In Sustaining the validity of this provision, the "Court said in Scales vs. United States:
It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with Which we are here concerned is not constitutionally protected speech, and that it was a combination Further Established to promote Such advocacy, albeit under the aegis of what purports to be a political party, is not Such association as is protected by the First Amendment. We can discern no reason why the membership, when it constitutes a purposeful form of complicity in a group Engaging in this same forbidden advocacy, shouldnt Receive any greater degree of protection from the guarantees of that Amendment.
Moreover, as was held in another case, where the problems of accommodating the exigencies of self-preservation and the values ​​of liberty are as complex and intricate as in the situation described in the legislative findings in the US Stated Federal Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 , the legislative judgment as to how that threat has best be met consistently with the safeguards of personal freedoms is not to be set aside merely Because the judgment of judges would, in the first instance, have chosen other methods. 48 For in truth, legislation, "whether it restrains freedom to hire or freedom to speak, is itself an effort and compromise Between the claims of the social order and individual freedom, and when the legislative compromise in Either case is brought to the judicial test the court stands one step removed from the conflict and its resolution through law. " 49
V. The Act and its Title
Tayag the respondent invokes the constitutional command that "there is no bill be enacted into Which law shall embrace more than one subject shall be expressed in Which the title of the bill." 50
What is assailed as not Germane to or embraced in the title of the Act is the last proviso of section 4 Which reads:
And provided, finally, That one who conspires with any other person to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, or the government of any of its political subdivisions by force, violence, Deceit, subversion or illegal Means, for the purpose of placing Such Government or political subdivision under the control and domination of any lien power, shall be punished by prision correccional to prision mayor with all the accessory penalties provided therefor in the same code.

It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, not only punishes membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines or similar associations, but as well "any conspiracy by two persons to overthrow the national or any local government by illegally Means, Even if their intent is not to establish a totalitarian regime, a democratic regime Burt, Even if their purpose is not to place the nation under an alien communist power, but under an alien democratic power like the United States or England or Malaysia or Even an anti-communist power like Spain, Japan, Taiwan or Thailand or Indonesia. "

The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines and Similar Associations, penalizing Membership Therein, and for other purposes"), has a short title. Section 1 provides that "This Act shall be Known as the Anti-Subversion Act." Together with the main title, the short title of the statute unequivocally indicates that the subject matter is subversion in general Which has for its fundamental purpose the substitution of a foreign totalitarian regime in place of the existing Government and not merely subversion by Communist conspiracies ..

The title of a bill need not be a Catalogue or an index of its contents, and need not Recite the details of the Act. 51 It is a valid title if it indicates in broad but clear termsthe nature, scope, and consequences of the proposed lawand its operation. 52 A narrow or technical construction isto be avoided, and the statute will be read fairly and reasonablyin order not to thwart the legislative intent. We holdthat the Anti-Subversion Act fully satisfies these requirements.

VI. Conclusions and Guidelines

In conclusions, Even as we UPHOLD the validity of the Anti-Subversion Act, we can not overemphasize the need for prudence and circumspection in its enforcement, operating as it does in the sensitive area of ​​freedom of expression and belief. Accordingly, we set the User is following basic guidelines to be Observed in any prosecution under the Act.The Government, in addition to proving the circumstances as there Affect Such liability, must establish the User is following elements of the crime of joining the Communist Party of the Philippines or any other subversive association:

(1) In the case of subversive organizations other than the Communist Party of the Philippines, (a) that the purpose of the organization is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and to establish in this country a totalitarian regime under the domination of a foreign power; (B) that the accused joined Such organizations: and (c) that he did so knowingly, willfully and by overt acts; and

(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines, (a) that the CPP Continues to Pursue the objectives Which led Congress in 1957 to declare it to be an organizedconspiracy for the overthrow of the Government by unlawful Means for the purpose of placing the country under thecontrol of a foreign power; (B) that the accused joined the CPP; and (c) that he did so willfully, knowingly and byovert acts.
We refrain from making any pronouncement as to the crime or remaining a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines or of any other subversive association: we leave this matter to future determination.
Accordingly, the questioned resolution of September 15, 1970 is set aside, and these two cases are hereby remanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits. Costs de oficio.
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo and Esguerra, JJ., C