EN BANC
G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001
JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his
essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of
the rights of the individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads
of societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating
the limits on individuality beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting
that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very
little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges that the
exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which
society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor
to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says -
The sole end for which
mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the
liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. The
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty
is the natural and illimitable right of the State to
self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and
cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system
of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom and inflict
punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's
individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the
social order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and
duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political
ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and State impositions
became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors,
the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright
collision, between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the
zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and dignity,
inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against
State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (
An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),
[1] as amended by RA 7659,
[2] wishes to impress upon us
that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but
distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally
infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to
subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because,
according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses
with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and,
(c) it abolishes the element of
mens rea in crimes already
punishable under
The Revised Penal Code,
all of which
are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to
due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
Specifically, the provisions
of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional
boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d)
"Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise
or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2)
hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees,
agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of
the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through
misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids
on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly
or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other
form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the
public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or
fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or
government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving
or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other
form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in
any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing
agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or
special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of
official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of
the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition
of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by
himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof,
in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the
said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime
of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by
the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the
court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and
their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and
shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in
favor of the State (underscoring supplied).
Section
4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of
establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each
and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being
sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring
supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of
the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations,
docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as
amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for
violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim.
Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d)
Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code);
and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as
amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed
an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman
for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of
the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for
reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications
"a," "b," and "c" to
give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents
necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised
were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of
offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The
purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which
they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus
indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the
Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558
finding that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to
justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On
25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by
the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner
moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the
facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since
the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the
Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1)
offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition
to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001
petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On
9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by
this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution
in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is
unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence
for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights
of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080
is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of
Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut
of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the
basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with
the Constitution.
[3] Courts invariably train
their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a
constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional
adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality
takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government
to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has
been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch
accords to its coordinate branch - the legislature.
If there is any reasonable
basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that
the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary
powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the
purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence
in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the
fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with
caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be
adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a
measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions
of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly
possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.
In
La Union Credit
Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon[4] we held that as
long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the
constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the case will
be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the
presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into
the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the law
clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic law, it
must be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental law
be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of
rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity
of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt
that there is indeed an infringement of the
constitution, for absent such a showing, there
can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if
well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice
Malcolm, "
To doubt is to sustain."
[5] And petitioner has miserably
failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption
of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the
Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which
would enable the accused to determine the nature of his
violation. Section 2 is
sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and
conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with
reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -
1. That the offender is a
public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or
other persons;
2. That he amassed,
accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of
the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation,
conversion, misuse, or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or
indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form
of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the
public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of
assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting
directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of
interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural,
industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation
of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special
interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves
at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate
amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired
is at least P50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords
some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it
what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its
application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more
importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed
conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that
what the assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing
or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00
through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the
Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended
Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with
reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner is
alleged to have committed:
"The undersigned
Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby
accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE
VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward
Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a.
Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane
Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does,
of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended
by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from
June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with
his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR
CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY
TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP,
CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY
SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS(P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY
UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF
THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY
OR A combination OR A series
of overtOR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR
MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting,
directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE
AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE
OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK
OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection
with co-accusedCHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy'
Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in considerationOF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL
GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING,
RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY
OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONALgain and
benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00),
more or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION
PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated
for the
province of Ilocos Sur under R.A.
No. 7171,by himself and/or in connivance with co-accused
Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio
Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN
DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and
compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000
SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS),
329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION
IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED
SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50)
AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND
AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL
OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF
SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS,
FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching
himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR
ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,
in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED
THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS
AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE
SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE
EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the
foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will
confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to
proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are
easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the
prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is
completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare
for an intelligent defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails
the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms "combination" and "series"
in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in
Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the
Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and
deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to
us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and
void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the
employment of terms without defining them;
[6] much less do we have to
define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive
constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each
and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the
form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words
employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity
of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be
gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled
principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in
their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,
[7] unless it is evident that
the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.
[8] The intention of the
lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to
use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always
presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the
following commonly accepted definition of the words
"combination" and "series:"
Combination - the
result or product of combining; the act or process of
combining. To combine is to bring into such close
relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series - a number
of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and
temporal succession.
That Congress intended the
words "combination" and "series" to
be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative
deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE
BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991
REP. ISIDRO: I
am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say
THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN
SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually
mean to say, if there are two or more means, we mean to say that number one and
two or number one and something else are included, how about a series of the
same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse,
will these be included also?
REP.
GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.
REP.
ISIDRO: Series.
REP.
GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But
we say we begin with a combination.
REP.
GARCIA: Yes.
REP.
ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -
REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two
but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one
enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not
twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other
words, that’s it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It
cannot be a repetition of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be
referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no.
Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: That’s not
series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem
to say that two or more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this
distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a
very good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary
crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One
after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would
fall under the term “series?”
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is
a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two
misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not
a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say
combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different
acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example,
ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series,
meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE
BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line
with our interpellations that sometimes “one” or maybe even “two” acts may
already result in such
a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider
deleting the words “a series of overt or,” to read, therefore: “or conspiracy
COMMITTED by criminal acts such as.” Remove the idea of necessitating “a
series.” Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would
mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two
or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes,
because “a series” implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted,
Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is
only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we
say “acts of plunder” there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other
words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law
speaks of "combination," it is referring to at
least two (2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided
in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d),
subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National
Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to
constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or
criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1,
par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation
and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall
under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature
intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and
"series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing
for it in the law.
As
for "pattern," we agree with the observations
of the Sandiganbayan
[9] that this term is sufficiently
defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -
x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of
the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination
or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of
Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of
overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to
enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful
scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common
goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme'
indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and
public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid
common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where
the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal
acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be
contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of
what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances,
petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is
manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in
various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute
establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient
definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct
is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that
specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which
cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said
to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its
application. In such instance, the statute is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice
of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.
[10] But the doctrine does not
apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but
which nonetheless specify
a standard though defectively phrased;
or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain
types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper
construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever
directed against such activities.
[11] With more reason, the
doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from
ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether
a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practice.
[12] It must be stressed,
however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable
degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility,
rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and
bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be
held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or
detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act,
it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other
statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence
we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations
of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad
do not justify a facial review of its validity -
The void-for-vagueness
doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law."
[13] The
overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental
purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."
[14]
A facial challenge is allowed
to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible
"chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that
"[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a
single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that
his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity."
[15] The
possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished
is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be
deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory
effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply
to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of
criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness
doctrines then have special application only to free speech
cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal
statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the
limited context of the First Amendment."
[16] In
Broadrick
v. Oklahoma,
[17] the
Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in
cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken
words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all,
have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought
to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held
that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no
set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."
[18] As
for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute
on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A
plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."
[19]
In sum, the doctrines of
strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for
testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they
are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be
made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With
respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom
application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the
statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to
other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional."
[20] As has been pointed out, "vagueness
challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges
typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter
of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular
defendant."
[21] Consequently,
there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the
Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its
face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on
the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose
activities are constitutionally protected.
[22] It
constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the
Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings
and in sterile abstract contexts.
[23] But,
as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in
Younger v. Harris[24]
[T]he task of analyzing a
proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of
these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative
remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief
sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required
line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . .
. ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory
for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on
its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as
"manifestly strong medicine," to be
employed "sparingly and only as a last resort,"
[25] and
is generally disfavored.
[26] In
determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which
are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of
the conduct with which the defendant is charged.
[27]
In light of the foregoing
disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so
tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than
real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by
dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil
at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of
the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other
part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to
overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of
the Plunder Law. Afortiori, petitioner
cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all
about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage,
petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the
Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his
affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound
constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of
Gallego
v. Sandiganbayan[28] must be mentioned if only
to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are loathed to declare a
statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and
deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable construction that
will support and give it effect. In that case, petitioners
Gallego and
Agoncillo challenged
the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of
The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners
posited, among others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly
imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior
judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par.
(e), violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient
notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that
the Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to
wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest
partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad
faith; and, (c) giving of
"unwarranted" benefits through gross
inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their official function and that
their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
them was violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3)
offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition,
this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect
of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality,"
"evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence"
merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3,
par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in
the same Information does not mean that the indictment charges three (3)
distinct offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not
uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support;
unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514);
or without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases,
Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and make
unlawful the act of the public officer in:
x x x or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x
x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended).
It is not at all difficult to
comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a
public officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which
is unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason,
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court
found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in
Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
which was understood in its primary and general
acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners' objection
thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue,
petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law
circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it
requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful
scheme or conspiracy -
SEC. 4. Rule
of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it
shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused
in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a
pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy.
The running fault in this
reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a
criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other
crimes, the accused always has in his favor the
presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless
the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that
culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.
[29] The use of
the "reasonable doubt" standard is
indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in the
application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral
force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people
in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also
important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary
affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a
criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with
utmost certainty. This "reasonable
doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm
of constitutional law as it gives life to the
Due Process Clause which
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
[30] The following
exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score
during the deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives are
elucidating -
DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now,
Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in
the information must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will
prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the
information, does that not work against the right of the accused especially so
if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less than P100
million, but the totality of the crime committed is P100 million
since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public document,
coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr.
Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt is every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr.
Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by the robber
in the information – three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These
need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the
conviction of a crime for which he was charged just because, say, instead of 3
pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. Now,
what is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the
offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am
aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the
totality of the amount is very important, I feel that such a series of overt
criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of
bribery, he was able to accumulate only P50,000 and in the crime of
extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1
million. Now, when we add the totality of the other acts as required
under this bill through the interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just
one single act, so how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With
due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the
crime, there is a need to prove that element beyond reasonable
doubt. For example, one essential element of the crime is that the
amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of
defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount
would be P110 or P120 million, but there are certain
acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts involved in those
transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these
transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is P100 million, then
there is a crime of plunder (underscoring supplied).
It is thus plain from the
foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard
quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains
with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element
necessary to constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does
away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal
misconception of the import of that provision. What the
prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts
sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and
involving an amount of at least
P50,000,000.00. There
is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have
been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To
illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder
with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public
treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50)
raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids
beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at least
P50,000,000.00.
[31]
A reading of Sec. 2 in
conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion
that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of
accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated
otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par.
(d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the
predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and
common sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination or series
of overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00
or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill
gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a
deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with
the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's
contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that
"pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of
plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains
a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that
without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder -
JUSTICE
BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the
Plunder Law without applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In
that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised
Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE
BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are
proved beyond reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can you not have a
conviction under the Plunder Law?
ATTY.
AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE
BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in
convicting an accused charged for violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY.
AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a
substantive element of the law x x x x
JUSTICE
BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when
there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts charged constituting
plunder?
ATTY.
AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it
contains a rule of evidence and it contains a substantive element of the crime
of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE
BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as
the predicate crimes charged are concerned that you do not have to go that far
by applying Section 4?
ATTY.
AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very
important element of the crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided by the
prosecution.[32]
We do not subscribe to
petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder
can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec.
1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover,
the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of
Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of
plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than
prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for
plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define
or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in
furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to
substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a
conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is
to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the
fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed
and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may
simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting
in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant
Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a
separability clause -
Sec. 7. Separability
of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof
to any person or circumstance
is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the
application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be
affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing
section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result
of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although
it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly
be treated independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the
objectives of the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue,
again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which
requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring
Opinion -
x x x Precisely
because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element
of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for
plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that
the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and
criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention
that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and
that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the
following remarks of Senator Tañada made during the deliberation on S.B. No.
733:
SENATOR TAÑADA . .
. And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be
evidence for each and every individual criminal act but only evidence
sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of
plunder.
[33]
However, Senator Tañada was
discussing §4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by
petitioner:
SENATOR
ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained
in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide
for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR
TAÑADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .
[34]
Senator Tañada was only saying
that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not
prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it
being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or ciminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far
as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of
the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be
shown.
Indeed, §2 provides that -
Any person who participated
with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to
the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In
the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal
Code, shall be considered by the court.
The application of mitigating
and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under
the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that
mens rea is
an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is
determined by his criminal intent. It is true that §2 refers
to "any person who participates with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it
does not apply as well to the public officer as principal in the
crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to
all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but
there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what
they obviously mean."
[35]
Finally, any doubt as to
whether the crime of plunder is a
malum in se must be deemed
to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to
include it among the heinous crimes punishable by
reclusion perpetua to
death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight
penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous
crimes, this Court held in
People v. Echegaray:
[36]
The evil of a crime may take
various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very
nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is
treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the
normal course of his or her growth as a human being . . .
. Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or
the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive
arson resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in
the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape,
parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal
detention, where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious
physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made
or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional
mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by
reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however,
in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the
subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic
context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide
for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of
corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the
population, the Philippine Government must muster the political will to
dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated
criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and
the psyche of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking
the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual
threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of
the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less
heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery,
destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government
officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed
to cause further destruction and damage to society.
The legislative declaration in
R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a
malum
in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or
inherently wrong, they are
mala in se[37] and
it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially
since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly
mala in se. Indeed,
it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere
prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an
ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the
acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise
assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on
constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too
late in the day for him to
resurrect this long dead issue,
the same having been eternally consigned by
People v.
Echegaray[38] to the archives of jurisprudential
history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is
constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by
necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of
it.
Our nation has been racked by
scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which
have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy
of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in
the corridors of time as unscrupulous people
relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the
coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are
imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical
and economically catastrophic looting of the national
treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to
disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if left
unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral
and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a
living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this
scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and other venalities in
public office.
These are times that try men's
souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of
national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by
petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual
prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This
continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people
that may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion
call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge
triumphant in the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this
Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA
7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare
the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Buena, and De Leon,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. C.J., Melo,
Quisumbing, JJ., join concurring opinion of J. Mendoza.
Puno, Vitug, JJ., concurred
and joins J. Mendoza's concurring opinion.
Mendoza,
J.,
please see concurring opinion.
Panganiban J.,
please see separate concurring opinion.
Carpio, J., no
part. Was one of the complainants before Ombudsman.
[1] Approved
12 July 1991 and took effect 8 October 1991.
[2] Approved
13 December 1993 and took effect 31 December 1993.
[3] Lim
v. Pacquing, et al., G.R. No. 115044, 27 January 1995, 240 SCRA 644.
[4] G.R.
No. 87001, 4 December 1989, 179 SCRA 828.
[5] Yu
Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 414 (1925).
[6] 82
C.J.S. 68, p. 113; People v. Ring, 70 P.2d 281, 26 Cal. App. 2d
Supp. 768.
[7] Mustang
Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104988, 18 June 1996, 257 SCRA 430,
448.
[8] PLDT
v. Eastern Telecommunications Phil., Inc., G.R. No. 943774, 27 August 1992, 213
SCRA 16, 26.
[9] Resolution
of 9 July 2001.
[10] See
People v. Nazario, No. L-44143, 31 August 1988, 165 SCRA 186, 195-196.
[12] State v.
Hill, 189 Kan 403, 369 P2d 365, 91 ALR2d 750.
[13] Connally v. General
Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 70 L. Ed. 328 (1926) cited in Ermita-Malate
Hotel and Motel Operators Ass'n. v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849, 867
(1967).
[14] NAACP v. Alabama,
377 U.S. 288, 307, 12, 2 L. Ed 325, 338 (1958); Shelton v. Tucker
364 U.S. 479, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1960).
[15] Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521, 31 L. Ed. 2d 408, 413 (1972) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
[16] United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 95 L. Ed 2d 697, 707
(1987); see also People v. De la Piedra, G.R. No. 121777, 24
January 2001.
[17] 413
U.S. 601, 612-613, 37 L. Ed 2d 830, 840-841 (1973).
[18] United
States v. Salerno, supra.
[19] Village
of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455
U.S. 489, 494-95, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362, 369 (1982).
[20] United
States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21, 4 L. Ed. 2d 524, 529
(1960). The paradigmatic case is Yazoo & Mississippi Valley
RR. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 57 L. Ed. 193 (1912).
[21] G.
Gunther & K. Sullivan, Constitutional Law 1299 (2001).
[22] Id.
at 1328. See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As Applied and Facial
Challenges, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1321 (2000) arguing that, in an important sense,
as applied challenges are the basic building blocks of constitutional
adjudication and that determinations that statutes are facially invalid
properly occur only as logical outgrowths of ruling on whether statutes may be
applied to particular litigants on particular facts.
[23] Constitution,
Art. VIII, §1 and 5. Compare Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936); "[T]he power of judicial review is
limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to be
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions
and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities."
[24] 401
U.S. 37, 52-53, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669, 680 (1971). Accord, United
States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 4 L. Ed. 2d 524 (1960); Board of
Trustees, State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 106 L. Ed. 2d
388 (1989).
[25] Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. at 613, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 841; National Endowment for the
Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998).
[26] FW/PBS,
Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 223, 107 L. Ed. 2d 603
(1990); Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
G.R. No. 135385, 6 December 2000 (Mendoza,J., Separate Opinion).
[27] United
States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33, 9 L. Ed.
2d 561, 565-6 (1963).
[28] G.R.
No. 57841, 30 July 1982, 115 SCRA 793.
[29] People v.
Ganguso, G.R. No. 115430, 23 November 1995, 250 SCRA 268, 274-275.
[30] People v. Garcia,
G.R. No. 94187, 4 November 1992, 215 SCRA 349, 360.
[31] Then
Senate President Jovito R. Salonga construed in brief the provision, thuswise:
“If there are let’s say 150 crimes all in all, criminal acts, whether bribery,
misappropriation, malversation, extortion, you need not prove all those beyond
reasonable doubt. If you can prove by pattern, let’s say 10, but
each must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, you do not have to prove 150
crimes. That’s the meaning of this (Deliberations of Committee on
Constitutional Amendments and Revision of Laws, 15 November 1988, cited in the
Sandiganbayan Resolution of 9 July 2001).
[32] TSN,
18 September 2001, pp. 115-121.
[33] 4
Record of the Senate 1316, 5 June 1989.
[35] Roschen
v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339, 73 L.Ed. 722, 728 (1929).
[36] 267
SCRA 682, 721-2 (1997) (emphasis added).
[37] Black's
Law Dictionary 959 (1990); Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 324, 338 (1986).
[38] G.R.
No. 117472, 7 February 1997, 267 SCRA 682.
