Biyernes, Abril 14, 2017

G.R. Nos. 142553-54. July 1, 2003

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 142553-54.  July 1, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ALBERT SAYANA, appellant.

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, J.:

Before us for automatic review is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 21, sentencing Albert Sayana to the supreme penalty of death for two counts of qualified rape.
Appellant was charged with two counts of rape committed against Cheska Angelika de Dios, the daughter of his common-law wife, Alma de Dios.  The Informations alleged:
Criminal Case No. 456-M-99
That on or about the 4th day of October 1998, in the municipality of Plaridel, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who was the common-law husband of the victim’s mother did then and there willfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, threat and intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of Cheska Angelika de Dios y Ely, an 11-year old girl, against her will and without her consent.
Contrary to law.[2]
Criminal Case No. 457-M-99
That in or about the month of March 1997, in the municipality of Plaridel, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who was the common-law husband of the mother of the victim, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, threat and intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of Cheska Angelika de Dios y Ely, an 11-year old girl, against her will and without her consent.
Contrary to law.[3]
The prosecution evidence showed that some time in March 1997, appellant forced himself upon the daughter of his common-law wife, eleven-year old Cheska Angelika de Dios.  The deed took place in their residence at Maria Lourdes Subdivision, Tabang, Plaridel, Bulacan. Cheska recounted that after dinnertime, while her mother was out of the house, appellant undressed her, laid on top of her, and made an up and down movement while he kissed her neck.  She felt pain in her private part.  She tried to scream but appellant covered her mouth. After the act, appellant wiped her private part, and proceeded to the bathroom to wash himself. Fear prevented Cheska from telling her mother about the incident as she had often witnessed how appellant would beat her mother.[4]
According to Cheska, appellant again violated her in the evening of October 4, 1998.  As before, appellant undressed her and placed himself on top of her.  Cheska felt an up and down movement, his private part touching hers.  At the same time, appellant would kiss her on the neck.  She felt pain in her private part.  Cheska also tried to free herself from his hold but appellant pinned her hands.  He also prevented her from shouting by covering her mouth.  After satisfying his lust, appellant wiped Cheska’s private part, and then went to the bathroom to wash.[5]
Cheska’s aunt, Erlinda Obuyes, told the court that Cheska’s mother called her on the phone on October 5, 1998, asking her to fetch her and her children at their residence in Bulacan as appellant had mauled her.  Erlinda brought Alma and her children to her home in Las Piñas, Metro Manila.  After two days, however, appellant came to get Alma and the children.  Alma went with appellant, together with their two children, but left Cheska to the care of Erlinda.  Erlinda sought the help of their other sister, Arlene Dy, to enroll Cheska at Isabelo Elementary School in Tondo, Manila so that she could continue her studies.  In mid-October, while Cheska was in the bathroom, Erlinda noticed a foul-smelling yellowish substance on Cheska’s underwear.  Erlinda brought Cheska to a midwife, then to a gynecologist, Dr. Nieves Montinola, who advised her to bring the young girl to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination.  At the NBI, however, Erlinda did not allow Cheska to be examined because the examining officer wanted to insert a tube measuring 4 centimeters in diameter and 1 foot in length into her niece’s genitalia.  Cheska eventually admitted to Erlinda that appellant had abused her.[6]
Upon advice of her brother, Erlinda brought Cheska to the Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory Office for examination.  Dr. Manuel Aves, a medico-legal officer at said office, examined Cheska on October 31, 1998.  The examination revealed:[7]
GENERAL AND EXTRA-GENITAL  :
          PHYSICAL BUILT        :           Heavy
          MENTAL STATUS       :
          BREAST                     :           Budding
          ABDOMEN                  :           Flat, soft
          PHYSICAL INJURIES  :           No signs of physical injury
GENITAL       :           The vulva is erythematous
          PUBIC HAIR                :           Absent
          LABIA MAJORA           :           Coaptated
          LABIA MINORA           :           Light pinkish
          HYMEN                        :           Superficial laceration
healed at 12 o’clock
                                              The hymen is elastic
                                              w/diameter of 1.2 to 1.5 cm.
EXTERNAL VAGINAL ORIFICE       :  The orifice w/ less
resistance upon inserting
                                                          prominent examining finger
VAGINAL CANAL      :
CERVIX                                :           rugosities smooth
PERI-URETHRAL AND VAGINAL SMEARS:  NEGATIVE
for spermatozoa
REMARKS    :           The subject is in non-virgin state on time of exam.
Dr. Aves explained that the erythematous vulva was a sign that there was manipulation in that area. He also stated that the vaginal laceration could have been due to either:  intercourse, masturbation or instrumentation.  Dr. Aves also observed that the diameter of the hymen was too wide for Cheska’s age.  He said that this could have been caused by penetration of the organ, either by instrument, or using of fingers or object, or intercourse.[8]
For his part, appellant interposed denial and alibi.  He claimed that it was impossible for him to rape Cheska in March 1997 as he was residing in Bataan at that time while Cheska and her mother were residing in Manila.  They moved to Bulacan only in October 1997.  He likewise denied having raped Cheska in the evening of October 4, 1998 because at that time, he was working in Malolos town proper.  He was employed as delivery driver at Chowking, Malolos Poblacion.  On that day, he left the house and went to work at 3:00 in the afternoon and returned home past 11:00 in the evening.[9]
Appellant swore that he treated Cheska as his own child and he did not have the heart to molest her.  He belied the testimony of Erlinda Obuyes that he was mauling Cheska’s mother, Alma.  He narrated that on October 5, 1998, Erlinda went to their house in Bulacan to get Alma and the children and brought them to her home in Las Piñas.  The following day, Alma went to see him and asked him to take them back.  But because he was busy, he found time to fetch them only after four days.  By that time, Arlene Dy had already taken Cheska in her custody.  Appellant, together with Alma and their two children, returned to their home in Plaridel, Bulacan.  They lived together as husband and wife until his parents took him back to Bataan on October 20, 1998.  Appellant alleged that Alma’s sisters might have concocted the charges against him for several reasons.  One, they were opposed to his relationship with Alma because they were cousins.  Two, he disapproved of Alma’s habit of going to her sisters in Manila whenever they would quarrel.  He said that Alma’s sisters resented this because it was Alma whom they would often instruct to procure illegal drugs to sustain their drug habit.  Three, he knew of the sisters’ vice and he once threatened to expose them to Arlene Dy’s husband who was providing financial support to the entire family.  Four, he knew of Arlene Dy’s illicit affair with another man and the fact that she had killed her former driver.  And fifth, during one of his fights with Alma, he threatened to reveal to the authorities the whereabouts of their father who was wanted for murder.[10]
Appellant’s alibi was corroborated by his father, Fausto Sayana, and their neighbor, Dominador Rivera, and also by his time card. Fausto Sayana and Dominador Rivera both testified that appellant lived with his parents in Morong, Bataan from February to August, 1997.[11]  Appellant’s time card, on the other hand, showed that on October 4, 1998, he reported for work at 3:20 pm and went off duty at 9:18 pm.[12]
The defense also presented Cheska’s school record[13] showing that in October 1997, she transferred from A. Aquino Elementary School to Tabang Elementary School as grade II pupil.  The following school year, she enrolled in third grade at Tabang Elementary School but again transferred to another school in October 1998.
Another evidence proferred by the defense was the Medico-Legal Report executed by Dr. Annabelle Soliman, Medico Legal Officer at NBI who examined Cheska on October 28, 1998.  Her findings indicate:[14]
GENERAL PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:
          Height:  144.0 cms.                             Weight:  100 lbs.
Fairly nourished, conscious, coherent, cooperative, ambulatory.  Breast, infantile.  Areolae, light brown, measures 2.5 cms. in diameter.  Nipples, flat, light brown, measures 0.5 cm. in diameter.
No extragenital physical injury noted.
GENITAL EXAMINATION:
Pubic hair, no growth.  Labia majora, minora, coaptated.  Fourchette, tense.  Vestibular mucosa, pinkish.  Hymen, short, thin, intact.  Hymenal orifice measures 1.2 cm. in diameter.  Vaginal walls and rugosities cannot be reached by examining finger.
CONCLUSIONS:
No evident signs of extragenital physical injury noted on the body of the subject at the time of examination.
Hymen, intact and its orifice small (1.2 cm. in diameter) as to preclude complete penetration by an average-sized adult male organ in full erection without producing hymenal injury.
Giving more weight to Cheska’s testimony, the trial court found appellant guilty of the charges and meted him the death penalty, thus:
All premises considered, the Court finds and so holds the accused Albert Sayana to be GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Rape in Criminal Case No. 456-M-99 and Criminal Case No. 457-M-99.
Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of Death by lethal injection on both counts.  Further, he is hereby ordered to indemnify the complaining witness Cheska Angelica de Dios in the sum of P75,000.00 in each of the two cases.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Appellant raised the following arguments in his brief:
1.       The trial court misappreciated the findings of the medico-legal, Dr. Aves and disregarded the findings of the medico-legal, Dr. Soliman.
2.       The trial court erred in failing to appreciate the inconsistencies in the statement and declarations of the complainant.
3.       The trial court erred in finding that the Prosecution has established the moral certainty sufficient to overcome the innocence of the accused beyond doubt, despite the contradictions and inconsistencies of her declarations and her witness and impossibility of her story.
4.       The trial court erred in completely disregarding the defense of the accused.
5.       The trial court erred in failing to consider that complainant and her aunt were ill-motivated.[16]
We reverse the decision of the trial court.
In reviewing rape cases, the Court has always been guided by the following principles:  (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove the charge; (2) considering that, in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[17]
The gravamen in the crime of rape is carnal knowledge.  The prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had sexual contact with the alleged victim.  This, the prosecution failed to do in this case.  While the complainant testified that appellant forced her into sexual intercourse on two occasions, the physical evidence clouds her testimony.  Records show that the complainant was examined by several doctors.  However, only the reports of the last two doctors who examined her were offered as evidence.  The report of Dr. Annabel Soliman, Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI shows that there were no signs of injury in complainant’s genitalia.  In a later examination, however, conducted by Dr. Manuel Aves of the Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory Office, a healed superficial hymenal laceration at 12:00 position was found.  Dr. Aves explained that the location of the laceration excludes sexual intercourse as possible cause thereof.  Dr. Aves explained that lacerations found on the upper portion of the hymen are normally caused by instrumentation but not by sexual contact.  Dr. Aves testified as follows on direct examination:
xxx
Q:   Will you please tell us, on the basis of this medico legal report, what were your findings in your examination?
A:    There are two stages of examining the victim.  One is extragenital and two is genital area.  In the extragenital, there was (sic) no remarkable findings.  The vulva is erythematous, the full area of the genital area is inflamed, congested.  There is absence of pubic hair, the labia majora is captated (sic) which is normal, the labia minora is light pinkish which is normal color and then on the hymen I noted a superficial laceration, healed at 12 o’clock position and then it is also elastic with a diameter of 1.2 to 1.5 cm. which is too wide for her at her age and then the external orifice, there is a less resistance upon inserting rugositis (sic) then the cervix is smooth, negative for spermatozoa with the remarks that the subject is in a non-virgin state during the time of examination.
Q:   Mr. Witness, what could be (sic) caused this vulva to become erythematous?
A:    There is a sign of manipulation on that area, sir.
xxx[18]
On cross-examination, Dr. Aves ruled out penile penetration as possible cause of the hymenal laceration, and submitted that it was more probably caused by instrumentation, thus:
xxx
Q:   Now, you have this finding here superficial laceration healed at 12 o’clock position, in layman’s language, what do you mean here when you say 12 o’clock?
A:    It is the position of the laceration.  For example, that clock, the 12 o’clock is on the upper portion, the 6 o’clock position is the lower position, sir.
Q:   On the basis of your experience, when you had examined the patients in connection with rape cases, is it normal in rape case that the laceration is 12 o’clock or at the 6 o’clock position?
A:    If there were (sic) sexual intercourse or penetration of the vagina, the most common of the laceration is the lower portion 5, 6, 7 o’clock position, sir.
Q:   When you said the most common laceration if there was sexual intercourse is 5, 6, 7 o’clock position, it is unusual to have laceration at 12 o’clock position?
A:    There is no penile penetration on that part.  It might be insertion of the finger or any instrument, sir.  If the laceration is 6 o’clock, I said if the laceration is located at the lower portion of the area of the hymen, the most common cause is sexual intercourse or penile penetration, sir.
Q:   And what do you attribute usually to the presence of the laceration at 12 o’clock position?
A:    Usually it might be caused by insertion of fingers or any instrument, sir.
Q:   Would you say that such is more common with respect to the 12 o’clock position?
A:    Yes, sir.
Q:   Than sexual intercourse?
A:    Yes, sir.
Q:   But you are precluding the possibility that it was due to penile penetration?
A:    Yes, sir.
Atty. Ramos:
Q:   Doctor, the purported laceration that you found to (sic) Cheska Angelica is at 12 o’clock, you did not find any laceration at 6 o’clock area?
A:    It is only at the 12 o’clock position, sir.
Court:
Q:   Is it not a fact that there are some hymenal elasticity if there is sexual intercourse, (sic) you cannot find laceration?
A:    Yes, sir.
Atty. Ramos:
Q:   Mr. Witness, in the case of sexual intercourse, when a man is on top of a woman and making an up and down movement of the penis, you will agree that it is 6 o’clock position would be the possible laceration?
A:    Yes, sir, it is common.
Q:   And before the 12 o’clock position could be affected, (sic) it should be the 6 o’clock position in an up and down movement?
A:    Usually it is the 6 o’clock position the most common, sir.
Q:   On the basis of your findings, Doctor, what could be the cause of your finding of the laceration at 12 o’clock position could it be sexual intercourse or manipulation?
A:    In this particular case, it is manipulation, sir.
Q:   In this case?
A:    Yes, Your Honor.
Q:   Why do you say that?
A:    Because the position of the laceration of the hymen, sir.
Q:   The extent of the laceration?
A:    Yes, sir, it is too shallow.
xxx[19]
The explanation given by Dr. Aves who testified for the prosecution itself, plus the fact that complainant underwent several gynecological examinations before she went to the Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory Office discount the credibility of the latter’s testimony that she has been raped.
We are not unmindful of the Court’s ruling that the absence of laceration in the hymen does not preclude the existence of rape and that when a woman states that she has been raped, she states all that is necessary to prove the offense. These principles, however, do not in themselves support a conviction. They must be weighed with the presumption of innocence of the accused.  To support a finding of guilt, it is necessary that the complainant’s story be believable in itself.[20]
In this case, we find complainant’s testimony to be unclear and marked by some doubtful allegations.  For one, she failed to establish that they were already living with appellant in Tabang, Plaridel, Bulacan in March 1997, the alleged time of the commission of the first offense.  She testified on direct examination that they were already residing in Tabang, Plaridel, Bulacan in March 1997.  Her testimony, however, was impugned by her school records which showed that she went to school in A. Aquino Elementary School in Tondo, Manila as Grade II pupil until October 1997.  It was only in October 1997 when she transferred to Tabang Elementary School in Bulacan.  On cross examination, it appeared that she was unsure of the time when they moved to appellant’s house in Bulacan, thus:
xxx
Atty. Ramos:
Cheska Angelica, last time you stated that before you lived in Plaridel, Bulacan, you were in Manila?
A:    Yes, sir.
Q:   And you would agree with me that your address in Manila is at Solis Street, Tondo, Manila?
A:    Yes, sir.
Q:   And you left that place sometime in October 1997?
A:    No, sir.
Court:
When was it when you and your family transferred to  (sic) Tondo to Plaridel?
A:    Month of  January.  I forgot the year and date.
xxx
Court:
In Tondo, did you go to school?
A:    Yes, sir.
Q:   What grade?
A:    Grade I and kinder.
Atty. Ramos:
Did you not start your grade II in Tondo?
A:    No, sir.
Court:
So, you started schooling for grade II in Tabang and not in Tondo?
A:    I started my grade II in Tondo and I stopped then and transferred to Tabang, Plaridel.
Atty. Ramos:
And you continued your grade II in Tabang, Plaridel because at that time, you transferred your residence from Tondo to Tabang?
A:    Yes, sir.
Q:   You transferred your grade II in Tabang, Plaridel, Bulacan sometime in January when you transferred to Plaridel?
A:    (no answer.)
Court:
The Court will propound the question.  When you were in grade II, can you recall whether it was Christmas before or after Christmas when you transferred to Tabang and ultimately you conducted your grade II in the elementary school of the latter’s plac(e)?
A:    Before Christmas, your Honor.
Atty. Ramos:
A while ago, you said that it was in the month of January when you transferred your residence from Tondo to Plaridel, now are you saying that that was also the month when you transferred to Plaridel and enrolled in Grade II?
A:    Yes, sir.
Court:
Why did you say that you transferred before Christmas, what can you say about that?
A:    Before Christmas.
Q:   Do you understand (what) the month of January is?
A:    (no answer.)
Court:
The Court would like to apprise you that the month of January comes after Christmas?
A:    Yes, sir.
Q:   So, why is it that earlier, you said that you transferred in January;  whereas, in the latter part when you were asked by the Court, you said you transferred before Christmas and of course, before Christmas, did you mean that was before January when you transferred?
A:    I do not know.
Q:   The child maybe in (sic) confused, because there were transfer of residence and transfer of school.  Now, the time that you transferred, was it from the place, from the grade II in Tondo to grade II in Tabang?
A:    Both, your Honor.
xxx[21]
The time when complainant moved to Bulacan is a material fact that must be clearly established by the prosecution because appellant could not have committed the offense if it were true that complainant was still in Manila and appellant was in Bataan at the alleged time of its commission.
In addition, we observe that complainant’s narration of how appellant allegedly ravished her on two occasions were incredibly identical, as if lifted from a single script.
We have held in several cases that the lone uncorroborated testimony of the complainant is sufficient to warrant a conviction, provided that such is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.  However, we have also held that the testimony of the complainant should not be received with precipitate credulity but with utmost caution.  The test for determining the credibility of complainant’s testimony is whether it is in conformity with common knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind. Whatever is repugnant to these standards becomes incredible and lies outside judicial cognizance.[22] Complainant’s testimony in this case fails to satisfy the test of credibility.
Moreover, it appears that complainant’s aunts have sufficient motive to concoct falsehoods against appellant.  The latter mentioned several reasons why they resented him and the prosecution never refuted these allegations.  The records show that these charges were filed against appellant upon the prompting of complainant’s aunts.
In rape cases, it is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its case with clarity and persuasion to the end that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion.  Proof beyond reasonable doubt is required. Although the law does not demand absolute certainty of guilt, it nonetheless requires moral certainty to support a judgment of conviction. Where the inculpatory facts admit of several interpretations, one consistent with accused’s innocence and another with his guilt, the evidence thus adduced fails to meet the test of moral certainty and it becomes the constitutional duty of the Court to acquit the accused.[23]  Such is the case here. 
IN VIEW WHEREOF, appellant Albert Sayana is ACQUITTED.  The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby ordered to immediately release appellant from the New Bilibid Prison and to report to this Court compliance with this order within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., andAzcuna, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.
Austria-Martinez, J., on official leave.

[1] Original Records, pp. 108-115.
[2] Id. at 2.
[3] Id. at 11.
[4] TSN, April 5, 1999, pp. 6-13.
[5] TSN, April 14, 1999, pp. 4-12.
[6] TSN, May 10, 1999, pp. 4-12; May 14, 1999, pp. 2-5.
[7] Exhibit “B”, Original Records, p. 45.
[8] TSN, June 25, 1999, pp. 5-8.
[9] TSN, April 9, 1999, pp. 3-8; August 18, 1999, pp. 2-9. 
[10] TSN, September 6, 1999, pp. 4-13.
[11] TSN, November 22, 1999, p. 4; December 17, 1999, p. 3.
[12] Exhibits “8” & “9”, Original Records, p. 95.
[13] Exhibits “10” & “13”, Original Records, pp. 96-97.
[14] Exhibit “1”, Original Records, p. 90.
[15] Decision, Crim. Cases Nos. 456-M-99 & 457-M-99, p. 8, Original Records, p. 115.
[16] Appellant’s Brief, pp. 13-14, Rollo, pp. 63-64.
[17] People vs. Morales, 363 SCRA 342 (2001); People vs. Villalobos, 358 SCRA 84 (2001); People vs. De la Cruz, 356 SCRA 704 (2001).
[18] TSN, June 25, 1999, pp. 6-7.
[19] TSN, June 25, 1999, pp. 13-16.
[20] See People vs. Dela Cruz, supra note 17.
[21] TSN, April 26, 1999, pp. 2-6
[22] People vs. De la Cruz, supra note 17.
[23] People vs. De la Cruz, supra note 17; People vs. Aballe, 357 SCRA 802 (2001); People vs. Villalobos, supra note 17.



G.R. No. 129305. January 18, 2001


G.R. No. 129305.  January 18, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SUKARNO DINDO y GIAMALO, accused-appellant. 
 D E C I S I O N 
BUENA, J.: 

 For the death of Crestita Lao, herein accused-appellant Sukarno Dindo was charged, tried  and convicted of murder by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 156, in Criminal Case No. 110648-H and sentenced, thus:

“WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby CONVICTS accused SUKARNO DINDO y Giamalo of the crime of Murder, qualified bytreachery and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of victim Crestita Lao y Claver in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); to pay the sum of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) as funeral expenses; and the further sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) by way of moral and exemplary damages, all without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. “In the service of his sentence said accused shall be credited in full with the period of his preventive imprisonment. “Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused SUKARNO DINDO y Giamalo from the BJMP, Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City. “SO ORDERED.”[1] 

 The Information filed against accused-appellant reads: “On or about July 28,1996, in Taguig, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another with three (3) unidentified male persons whose true identities and present whereabouts are still unknown, with intent to kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot Crestita Lao y Claver with a gun, thereby inflicting upon said Crestita Lao y Claver gunshot wound, which directly caused her death.”[2]

 Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.  Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. The prosecution’s evidence tends to establish that at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning of July 28,1996, Crestita Lao, together with her daughter, Nympha Lao, and two Taiwanese nationals, Hwang Yu Chin-in and Chin Fu Hwang, boarded the tricycle being driven by accused-appellant in front of the Taguig National High School in Taguig.  Crestita Lao sat at the front passenger seat near the driver’s seat with Yu Chin-in while Nympha Lao and Chin Fu Hwang occupied the back seat of the sidecar. Crestita Lao contracted to pay the fare for the remaining two unoccupied seats and directed accused-appellant to drive towards FTI, Alabang. However, before they could proceed, three (3) men boarded the same; two sat behind accused-appellant while the other seated himself beside the side-wheel.  When they were about fifty (50) meters from the terminal, accused-appellant turned towards the Sta. Nina Rasul Cemetery. Surprised by the deviation from the route, Crestita Lao asked accused-appellant, in Muslim language, “ano ito? ano ito?”. One of the men replied, “wala ito, wala ito.” After a few turns, accused-appellant stopped in front of the cemetery and the three (3) men alighted. The man wearing a black jacket drew his gun and pointed it at Nympha Lao and Chin Fu Hwang. Believing that they were being held-up, Nympha Lao removed her wristwatch and gave it to the man holding the gun. But the latter refused to take the wristwatch. When Nympha Lao tried to alight from the tricycle she was pushed back. Thereupon, she heard her mother twice say,   “Wala kaming pera, ito lang.” Soon afterward, she heard a gunshot. Nympha Lao looked behind her and saw the three (3) men running away towards the cemetery. Stunned by what he witnessed, Hwang Yun Chin-in likewise ran away. Nympha Lao alighted from the tricycle and saw her mother lying on the ground with a gunshot on the upper left eyebrow. She sought the help of her neighbor Mario dela Serna and brought her mother to the hospital where she was declared dead. Accused-appellant also fled after the incident.[3]

 A post-mortem examination on the cadaver of Crestita Lao by Dr. Emmanuel L. Aranas revealed the following findings:

“Gunshot wound, thru and thru, point of entry, left supraorbital region, measuring by 0.5 cm, 6 cm from the anterior midline, with surrounding tattooing measuring 3.5 by 4 cm, directed posteriorwards, upwards, and medialwards, fracturing the frontal, left parietal bones, and lacerating the left celebral hemisphere, with intracranial hemorrhages, making a point of exit at the left parietal region, measuring 2 by 1.8 cm, 4 cm from the midsagittal line.

x x x

“Cause of death is gunshot wound of the head.”[4]

 Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He testified that at around 9:00 o’clock in the morning of July 28, 1996, while he was at IRM Maharlika, Taguig, five (5) persons boarded his tricycle. Then, one of the passengers told him, “sige na,” Before he could drive away, three (3) men boarded the tricycle. Two occupied the seat behind him while the other man sat at the sideboard of the tricycle. Accused-appellant drove towards the FTI, Taguig. When they reached the Santa Nina Rasul Cemetery, the man behind him poked a gun at him, and directed him to stop. Thereafter, the man alighted. At that instance, accused-appellant heard one of the men say, “ilabas ang pera” to which one of the woman passengers replied that they had no money. Again, he heard another man asking for money and someone replied saying they had none. At that instance, accused-appellant heard shots. He alighted and saw one of the men pointing a gun. Fearing for his life, he fled towards the cemetery, then to a shop to seek help. Not finding anyone, he went back to his tricycle and found no one. He drove his tricycle to the police station at Upper Bicutan to report the incident.[5]

 The trial court found the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused-appellant.  It ruled that the acts of accused-appellant in taking other passengers despite the victim’s payment for the unoccupied seats, and in deviating from the usual route indicate that he conspired with the three assailants to kill Crestita Lao. His actions, the trial court held, show that he “shared in the guilty purpose and encouraged the crime by his presence at the time of the perpetration and that he had known beforehand of what will transpire as soon as they reached the cemetery.”[6]

 Accused-appellant now challenges the aforesaid decision before this Court arguing that the trial court manifestly erred in convicting him despite the prosecution’s failure to present concrete and convincing evidence to prove that he conspired with the three unidentified men in the perpetration of the crime. After a thorough and judicious scrutiny of the evidence adduced by the opposing parties, we are of the considered view and so hold that the prosecution failed to establish, by the required quantum of proof, that accused-appellant agreed with the three unidentified men to kill Crestita Lao. The acts of accused-appellant in allowing the three unidentified men to board his tricycle despite the victim’s payment for the unoccupied seats, and in deviating from the usual route, which was the basis of his conviction, to our mind, are not sufficient evidence to prove or suggest a concerted action, much less unity of purpose, in perpetrating the slay of Crestita Lao. While it may elicit suspicion on the real nature of accused-appellant’s actuation, this is not evidence to prove the existence of criminal conspiracy. There is conspiracy where, at the time the malefactors were committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed a unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of the victim.[7]

Conspiracy, to be the basis for a conviction, should be proved as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself. No less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required, for conspiracy is not the product of negligence but intention on the part of the cohorts.[8]

Accused-appellant’s acts before, during and after the commission of the crime do not show any commonality in design and purpose with the assailants. No less than prosecution witness Nympha Lao admitted that accused-appellant had no participation in the assailed incident.[9]

 Moreover, it must be emphasized that the victim, together with her three other companions, sought accused-appellant to bring them to the FTI.  The three unidentified men suddenly boarded the tricycle and, with the gun pointed at accused-appellant, directed the latter to the Santa Nina Rasul Cemetery. When accused-appellant heard a shot, he immediately ran away and reported the incident to the police.[10] The fact that accused-appellant ran after the shooting incident was a natural reaction. Note that different people act differently to a given stimulus or type of situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, or startling, or frightful experience.[11] His presence at the scene of the crime, without more, is inadequate to support the conclusion that, indeed, he conspired with the assailants.[12] Additionally, the trial court’s observation that the accused-appellant pretended to report the shooting incident to the authorities to exonerate himself[13] is baseless.  On the contrary such act points toward accused-appellant’s innocence of the crime charged against him.  The reporting of the incident was spontaneous and the short interval between the time of the incident and the time accused-appellant went to the police precinct negates any insinuation that he pretended in reporting the same. There was no more time for him to concoct and invent stories.

 Thus, in the absence of any evidence that accused-appellant conspired with the assailants, conspiracy cannot be attributed against him for, in criminal cases, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish its case with that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind, with evidence which stands or falls on its merits, and which cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[14] Unless it discharges the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the latter need not even offer evidence in his behalf.[15]

Thus, when the guilt of the accused has not been proven with moral certainty, such as the case at bar, it is the policy of long standing that the presumption of innocence of the accused must be favored and his exoneration be granted as a matter of right.[16] We do not deny that a life has been taken and justice demands that the wrong be redressed, but this justice that calls for retribution cannot be the same one that would convict an accused whose guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.[17]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused-appellant Sukarno Dindo y Giamalo is hereby ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. The immediate release from confinement of accused-appellant is ordered unless some other lawful cause warrants his further detention. The Director of Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision and to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

 SO ORDERED.

 Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.


 [1]  RTC Decision, pp. 120-126, Records.
[2]  Information, p. 1, Records.
[3]  TSN, October 2, 1996, pp. 2-10; October 23, 1996, p. 5.
[4]  Medico-Legal Report No. M-0407-96, Exh. “E”, p. 49, Records.
[5]  TSN, February 4, 1997, pp. 2-5.
[6]  RTC Decision, p 6.
[7]  People vs. Desoy, 312 SCRA 432, 441 [1999].
[8]  People vs. PO3 Patalinghug, 318 SCRA 116, 139 [1999].
[9]  TSN, October 2, 1996, p. 17. “Q            Likewise you did not witness any participation of the accused here in that incident? “A            None, sir.”
[10]  TSN, February 4, 1997, p. 3.
[11]  People vs. Luzorota, 286 SCRA 487 [1998].
[12]  Abad vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 56 [1998].
[13]  RTC Decision, p. 6. [14]  People vs. Quitorio, 285 SCRA 196 [1998].
[15]  People vs. Hilario, 284 SCRA 344 [1998].
[16]  Cosep vs. People, 290 SCRA 378 [1998].
[17]  Abad vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 56 [1998].

Martes, Setyembre 23, 2014

G.R. No. 151876. June 21, 2005


[G.R. No. 151876.  June 21, 2005]
SUSAN GO and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. FERNANDO L. DIMAGIBA, respondent.

D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:


Administrative Circular 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative Circular 13-2001, merely establishes a rule of preference in imposing penalties for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), the “Bouncing Checks Law.”  When the circumstances of both the offense and the offender indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone -- instead of imprisonment -- is the preferred penalty.  As the Circular requires a review of the factual circumstances of a given case, it applies only to pending or future litigations.  It is not a penal law; hence, it does not have retroactive effect.  Neither may it be used to modify final judgments of conviction.

The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the October 10, 2001[2] and the October 11, 2001[3] Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) (Branch 5), Baguio City.[4] The October 10, 2001 Order released Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba from confinement and required him to pay a fine of P100,000 in lieu of imprisonment.  The October 11, 2001 Order disposed as follows:
“WHEREFORE, [in] applying the doctrine as held in the above-entitled cases in this case, the instant petition for Habeas Corpus should be, as it is hereby, GRANTED.  The Baguio City Jail Warden is hereby ordered to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE the petitioner from confinement unless he is being held for some other lawful cause other than by virtue of the Sentence Mittimus dated September 28, 2001 issued by CESAR S. VIDUYA, Clerk of Court, MTC 4, Baguio City.  Further, the petitioner is required to pay a fine in the amount of P100,000.00 in lieu of his imprisonment, in addition to the civil aspect of the Joint Judgment rendered by MTC 4 dated July 16, 1999.”[5]

The Facts
The pertinent facts are not disputed.  Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba issued to Petitioner Susan Go thirteen (13) checks which, when presented to the drawee bank for encashment or payment on the due dates, were dishonored for the reason “account closed.”[6] Dimagiba was subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22[7] under separate Complaints filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Baguio City.[8] After a joint trial, the MTCC (Branch 4) rendered a Decision on July 16, 1999, convicting the accused in the 13 cases. The dispositive portion reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, this Court finds the evidence of the prosecution to have established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged and imposes upon the accused the penalty of 3 months imprisonment for each count (13 counts) and to indemnify the offended party the amount of One Million Two Hundred Ninety Five Thousand Pesos (P1,295,000.00) with legal interest per annum commencing from 1996 after the checks were dishonored by reason ‘ACCOUNT CLOSED’ on December 13, 1995, to pay attorney’s fees of P15,000.00 and to pay the costs.”[9]
The appeal of Dimagiba was raffled to Branch 4 of the RTC in Baguio City.[10] On May 23, 2000, the RTC denied the appeal and sustained his conviction.[11] There being no further appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the RTC issued on February 1, 2001, a Certificate of Finality of the Decision.[12]
Thus, on February 14, 2001, the MTCC issued an Order directing the arrest of Dimagiba for the service of his sentence as a result of his conviction.  The trial court also issued a Writ of Execution to enforce his civil liability.[13]
On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the MTCC Order.  He prayed for the recall of the Order of Arrest and the modification of the final Decision, arguing that the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment also, should have been imposed on him.[14] The arguments raised in that Motion were reiterated in a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution filed on February 28, 2001.[15]
In an Order dated August 22, 2001, the MTCC denied the Motion for Reconsideration and directed the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against Dimagiba.[16] On September 28, 2001, he was arrested and imprisoned for the service of his sentence.
On October 9, 2001, he filed with the RTC of Baguio City a Petition[17] for a writ of habeas corpus.  The case was raffled to Branch 5, which scheduled the hearing for October 10, 2001.  Copies of the Order were served on respondent’s counsels and the city warden.[18]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Right after hearing the case on October 10, 2001, the RTC issued an Order directing the immediate release of Dimagiba from confinement and requiring him to pay a fine of P100,000 in lieu of imprisonment.  However, the civil aspect of the July 16, 1999 MTCC Decision was not touched upon.[19] A subsequent Order, explaining in greater detail the basis of the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, was issued on October 11, 2001.[20]
In justifying its modification of the MTCC Decision, the RTC invoked Vaca v. Court of Appeals[21] and Supreme Court Administrative Circular (SC-AC) No. 12-2000,[22] which allegedly required the imposition of a fine only instead of imprisonment also for BP 22 violations, if the accused was not a recidivist or a habitual delinquent.  The RTC held that this rule should be retroactively applied in favor of Dimagiba.[23] It further noted that (1) he was a first-time offender and an employer of at least 200 workers who would be displaced as a result of his imprisonment; and (2) the civil liability had already been satisfied through the levy of his properties.[24]
On October 22, 2001, Petitioner Go filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Orders dated October 10 and 11, 2001.[25] That Motion was denied on January 18, 2002.[26]
Hence, this Petition filed directly with this Court on pure questions of law.[27]

The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for this Court’s consideration:
“1.       [The RTC] Judge was utterly devoid of jurisdiction in amending a final and conclusive decision of the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 4, dated July 16, 1999, in nullifying the Sentence Mittimus, dated September 28, 2001, issued by x x x [the] Municipal Trial Court, Branch 4, Baguio City, and in ordering the release of [Dimagiba] from confinement in jail for the service of his sentence under the said final and conclusive judgment;
“2.       Assuming only for the sake of argument that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, the Petition for Habeas Corpus is utterly devoid of merit as [Dimagiba was] not entitled to the beneficent policy enunciated in theEduardo Vaca and Rosa Lim cases and reiterated in the Supreme Court Circular No. 12-2000; x x x
“3.       Granting for the sake of argument that [Dimagiba was] entitled to the beneficent policy enunciated in the Eduardo Vaca and Rosa Lim cases and reiterated in the Supreme Court Circular No. 12-2000, the minimum fine that should be imposed on [Dimagiba] is one million and two hundred ninety five thousand pesos (P1,295,000.00) up to double the said amount or (P2,590,000), not just the measly amount of P100,000; and
“4.       [The RTC] judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in hearing and deciding [Dimagiba’s] Petition for Habeas Corpus without notice and without affording procedural due process to the People of the Philippines through the Office of [the] City Prosecutor of Baguio City or the Office of the Solicitor General.”[28]
In the main, the case revolves around the question of whether the Petition for habeas corpus was validly granted.  Hence, the Court will discuss the four issues as they intertwine with this main question.[29]

The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.

Main Issue:
Propriety of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus
The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which individuals are deprived of liberty.[30] It was devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint; or, more specifically, to obtain immediate relief for those who may have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus deliver them from unlawful custody.[31] It is therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test the circumstances under which a person is detained.[32]
The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue of a valid judgment.[33] However, as a post-conviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant:  (1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess.[34]
In the present case, the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was anchored on the ruling in Vaca and on SC-AC No. 12-2000, which allegedly prescribed the imposition of a fine, not imprisonment, for convictions under BP 22.  Respondent sought the retroactive effect of those rulings, thereby effectively challenging the penalty imposed on him for being excessive.  From his allegations, the Petition appeared sufficient in form to support the issuance of the writ.
However, it appears that respondent has previously sought the modification of his sentence in a Motion for Reconsideration[35] of the MTCC’s Execution Order and in a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution.[36] Both were denied by the MTCC on the ground that it had no power or authority to amend a judgment issued by the RTC.
In his Petition for habeas corpus, respondent raised the same arguments that he had invoked in the said Motions.  We believe that his resort to this extraordinary remedy was a procedural infirmity.  The remedy should have been an appeal of the MTCC Order denying his Motions, in which he should have prayed that the execution of the judgment be stayed.  But he effectively misused the action he had chosen, obviously with the intent of finding a favorable court.  His Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to reopen a case that had already become final and executory.  Such an action deplorably amounted to forum shopping.  Respondent should have resorted to the proper, available remedy instead of instituting a different action in another forum.
The Court also finds his arguments for his release insubstantial to support the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

Preference in the
Application of Penalties
for Violation of BP 22
The following alternative penalties are imposable under BP 22: (1) imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but not more than one year; (2) a fine of not less or more than double the amount of the check, a fine that shall in no case exceed P200,000; or (3) both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.[37]
SC-AC No. 12-2000, as clarified by SC-AC No. 13-2001,[38] established a rule of preference in imposing the above penalties.[39] When the circumstances of the case clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone may be considered as the preferred penalty.[40] The determination of the circumstances that warrant the imposition of a fine rests upon the trial judge only.[41] Should the judge deem that imprisonment is appropriate, such penalty may be imposed.[42]
SC-AC No. 12-2000 did not delete the alternative penalty of imprisonment.  The competence to amend the law belongs to the legislature, not to this Court.[43]

Inapplicability of
SC-AC No. 12-2000
Petitioners argue that respondent is not entitled to the benevolent policy enunciated in SC-AC No. 12-2000, because he is not a “first time offender.”[44] This circumstance is, however, not the sole factor in determining whether he deserves the preferred penalty of fine alone.  The penalty to be imposed depends on the peculiar circumstances of each case.[45] It is the trial court’s discretion to impose any penalty within the confines of the law.  SC-AC No. 13-2001 explains thus:
“x x x.  Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of BP 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty.  Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge.  x x x.
It is, therefore, understood that:
x x x                                         x x x                                  x x x
“2.       The Judges concerned, may in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice;”
The Court notes that the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus relied mainly on the alleged retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000, which supposedly favored BP 22 offenders.[46] On this point, Dimagiba contended that his imprisonment was violative of his right to equal protection of the laws, since only a fine would be imposed on others similarly situated.[47]
The rule on retroactivity states that criminal laws may be applied retroactively if favorable to the accused.  This principle, embodied in the Revised Penal Code,[48] has been expanded in certain instances to cover special laws.[49]
The issue of retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000 was settled in De Joya v. Jail Warden of Batangas City,[50] which we quote:
“Petitioner's reliance of our ruling in Ordoñez v. Vinarao that a convicted person is entitled to benefit from the reduction of penalty introduced by the new law, citing People v. Simon, is misplaced.  Thus, her plea that as provided for in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as modified by SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001 should benefit her has no basis.
“First. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final judgment.
“Second. As explained by the Court in SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely lays down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent behind the law. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely urges the courts to take into account not only the purpose of the law but also the circumstances of the accused -- whether he acted in good faith or on a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence -- and such other circumstance which the trial court or the appellate court believes relevant to the penalty to be imposed.”[51]
Because the Circular merely lays down a rule of preference, it serves only as a guideline for the trial courts.  Thus, it is addressed to the judges, who are directed to consider the factual circumstances of each case prior to imposing the appropriate penalty.  In other words, the Administrative Circular does not confer any new right in favor of the accused, much less those convicted by final judgment. 
The competence to determine the proper penalty belongs to the court rendering the decision against the accused.[52] That decision is subject only to appeal on grounds of errors of fact or law, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.  Another trial court may not encroach upon this authority.  Indeed, SC-AC No. 12-2000 necessarily requires a review of all factual circumstances of each case.  Such a review can no longer be done if the judgment has become final and executory.
In the present case, the MTCC of Baguio City had full knowledge of all relevant circumstances from which respondent’s conviction and sentence were based.  The penalty imposed was well within the confines of the law.  Upon appeal, the conviction was sustained by RTC-Branch 4 of Baguio City.  Eventually, the Decision attained finality.  Hence, RTC-Branch 5 did not have the jurisdiction to modify the lawful judgment in the guise of granting a writ of habeas corpus.
The doctrine of equal protection of laws[53] does not apply for the same reasons as those on retroactivity.  Foremost of these reasons is that the Circular is not a law that deletes the penalty of imprisonment.  As explained earlier, it is merely a rule of preference as to which penalty should be imposed under the peculiar circumstances of a case.  At any rate, this matter deserves scant consideration, because respondent failed to raise any substantial argument to support his contention.[54]

Modification of Final
Judgment Not Warranted
The Court is not unmindful of So v. Court of Appeals,[55] in which the final judgment of conviction for violation of BP 22 was modified by the deletion of the sentence of imprisonment and the imposition of a fine.  That case proceeded from an “Urgent Manifestation of an Extraordinary Supervening Event,”[56] not from an unmeritorious petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as in the present case.  The Court exercised in that case its authority to suspend or to modify the execution of a final judgment when warranted or made imperative by the higher interest of justice or by supervening events.[57] The supervening event in that case was the petitioner’s urgent need for coronary rehabilitation for at least one year under the direct supervision of a coronary care therapist; imprisonment would have been equivalent to a death sentence.[58]
The peculiar circumstances of So do not obtain in the present case.  Respondent’s supposed “unhealthy physical condition due to a triple by-pass operation, and aggravated by hypertension,” cited by the RTC in its October 10, 2001 Order,[59] is totally bereft of substantial proof.  The Court notes that respondent did not make any such allegation in his Petition for habeas corpus.  Neither did he mention his physical state in his Memorandum and Comment submitted to this Court.
Respondent seeks the retroactive application of SC-AC No. 12-2000 in his favor on the basis alone of the alleged settlement of his civil liability.[60] Citing Griffith v. Court of Appeals,[61] he theorizes that answering for a criminal offense is no longer justified after the settlement of the debt. 
Respondent, however, misreads Griffith.  The Court held in that case that convicting the accused who, two years prior to the filing of the BP 22 cases, had already paid his debt (from which the checks originated) was contrary to the basic principles of fairness and justice.[62] Obviously, that situation is not attendant here. 
The civil liability in the present case was satisfied through the levy and sale of the properties of respondent only after the criminal case had been terminated with his conviction.[63] Apparently, he had sufficient properties that could have been used to settle his liabilities prior to his conviction.  Indeed, such an early settlement would have been an indication that he was in good faith, a circumstance that could have been favorably considered in determining his appropriate penalty.
At any rate, civil liability differs from criminal liability.[64] What is punished in the latter is not the failure to pay the obligation, but the issuance of checks that subsequently bounced or were dishonored for insufficiency or lack of funds.[65] The Court reiterates the reasons why the issuance of worthless checks is criminalized:
“The practice is prohibited by law because of its deleterious effects on public interest. The effects of the increase of worthless checks transcend the private interest of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation multiplied a thousand-fold can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public order.”[66]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Orders NULLIFIED.  Respondent’s Petition for habeas corpus is hereby DENIED.  Let this case be REMANDED to MTCC of Baguio City for the re-arrest of respondent and the completion of his sentence.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, pp. 4-39.  An RTC judgment may be directly appealed to this Court if the issues raised are purely questions of law.  (§1, Rule 45, Rules of Court)  Petitioner mistakenly impleaded the judge as respondent.  In a petition for review, the lower court is excluded as a respondent. (§4, id.)
[2] Rollo, pp. 90-91.
[3] Id., pp. 92-96.
[4] Presided by Judge Antonio M. Esteves.
[5] RTC Order, dated October 11, 2001, p. 5; rollo, p. 96.
[6] Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 17 (rollo, p. 442); Solicitor General’s Memorandum, p. 2; respondent’s Memorandum, p. 1 (rollo, p. 481).
[7] “An Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing and Issuance of a Check Without Sufficient Funds or Credit and for Other Purposes,” approved on April 3, 1979.
[8] Presided by Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes.
[9] MTCC Joint Judgment, dated July 16, 1999, p. 14; rollo, p. 53.
[10] Presided by Judge Amado S. Caguioa.
[11] RTC Decision, dated May 23, 2000; rollo, pp. 54-56.
[12] Certificate of Finality, dated February 1, 2001; rollo, p. 57.
[13] Annex “D,” Petition; rollo, p. 58.
[14] Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, dated February 27, 2001; rollo, pp. 60-66.
[15] Respondent’s Motion for Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution, dated February 28, 2001; rollo, pp. 67-73.
[16] Rollo, pp. 74-75.
[17] Rollo, pp. 76-79.  The case was entitled “In re: The Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpu[s] of Fernando Dimagiba,” with Dimagiba as petitioner and the warden of the Baguio City Jail as respondent.  Evidently, the former erred in titling his Petition.  Governed by Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, it should have properly been referred to as “Petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus.”
[18] Rollo, pp. 81-83.
[19] Assailed Order, dated October 10, 2001; rollo, pp. 90-91.
[20] Assailed Order, dated October 11, 2001; rollo, pp. 92-96.
[21] 359 Phil. 187, November 16, 1998.
[22] Issued on November 21, 2000.
[23] Assailed Order, dated October 11, 2001, pp. 3-4; rollo, p. 95-96.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration; rollo, pp. 97-106.
[26] RTC Order, dated January 18, 2002; rollo, p. 125.
[27] The case was deemed submitted for decision on September 2, 2004, upon this Court’s receipt of the solicitor general’s Memorandum, signed by Assistant Solicitors General Antonio L. Villamor and Rodolfo G. Urbiztondo, and Solicitor Luis F. Simon.  The Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for the People of the Philippines, was allowed to join as co-petitioner, per this Court’s Resolution dated November 25, 2002 (rollo, p. 137).
The Court received petitioner’s Memorandum, signed by Atty. Ariel Aloysius P. Ingalla, on July 26, 2004.  Respondent’s Memorandum, signed by Atty. Lauro D. Gacayan, was received on August 17, 2004.
[28] Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 21-22; rollo, pp. 446-447.
[29] The Court disregards the arguments of respondent in his Comment and Memorandum, in which he said that he was innocent of the charges of violating BP 22.  This Petition is not an appeal from his judgment of conviction.
[30] §1, Rule 102, Rules of Court.
[31] Velasco v. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 677, 679, July 7, 1995.  Also cited in Feria v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 412, 420, February 15, 2000.  See also Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778, 788, March 25, 1919.
[32] Velasco v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[33] §4, Rule 102, Rules of Court.
[34] De Villa v. The Director, New Bilibid Prisons, GR No. 158802, November 17, 2004; Feria v. Court of Appeals, supra; Andal v. People, 367 Phil. 154, 157, May 26, 1999; Harden v. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741, 746, October 22, 1948.
[35] Rollo, pp. 60-66.
[36] Id., pp. 67-73.
[37] §1, BP 22.
[38] Issued on February 14, 2001.
[39] Abarquez v. Court of Appeals, 408 SCRA 500, 511, August 7, 2003; Nagrampa v. People, 435 Phil. 440, 454, August 6, 2002; Tan v. Mendez Jr., 432 Phil. 760, 772, June 6, 2002.
The rationale of this Circular is found in Vaca v. Court of Appeals (supra) and Lim v. People (340 SCRA 497, 504, September 18, 2000).  In these cases, the Court held that it would best serve the ends of criminal justice if, in fixing the penalty to be imposed for violation of BP 22, the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed.  The Court meant redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness, with due regard to the protection of the social order.
[40] Administrative Circular 13-2001.  See also Tan v. Mendez, supra, p. 773.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.  §1, Article VI, Philippine Constitution.
[44] Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 28-29; rollo, pp. 453-454.
[45] Abarquez v. Court of Appeals; supra, p. 510.
In Vaca, petitioners were first-time offenders.  They were Filipino entrepreneurs who were presumed to contribute to the national economy.  They brought the appeal, mistakenly believing that they had committed no violation of BP 22.  Otherwise, they would have accepted the trial court’s judgment and applied for probation to avoid a prison term.  (Vaca v. Court of Appeals; supra, pp. 195-196).
[46] Rollo, pp. 76-78.
[47] Ibid.
[48] “Art. 22.  Retroactive effect of penal laws. – Penal laws shall have a retroactive insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, x x x although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.”
[49] People v. Langit, 392 Phil. 94, 119, August 4, 2000; Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, 343 Phil. 297, 306, August 18, 1997; People v. Ganguso, 320 Phil. 324, 340, November 23, 1995; People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555, 570, July 29, 1994.
This doctrine follows the rule that the provisions of the Revised Penal Code apply supplementarily to special laws.  Art. 10, Revised Penal Code.
[50] 417 SCRA 636, December 10, 2003.
[51] Id., p. 642, per Callejo Sr., J.
[52] It should be noted that a decision prepared, signed, and promulgated by a judge who has not fully or partly heard the case is valid.  It is sufficient that the judge, in deciding the case, completely relied on the records before him.  Villanueva v. Estenzo, 64 SCRA 407, 413-414, June 27, 1975.
[53] The Constitutional guarantee of equal protection of laws means that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of the laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.  Tolentino v. Board of Accountancy, 90 Phil. 83, 90, September 28, 1951.
[54] Dimagiba merely noted that the equal-protection clause of the Constitution required the retroactive application of SC-AC No. 12-2000.  Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 15; rollo, p. 495.
[55] 436 Phil. 683, 688, August 29, 2002.
[56] Id., p. 685.
[57] Id., p. 688.
[58] Ibid.
[59] RTC Order, dated October 10, 2001, p. 1; rollo, p. 90.
[60] Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 18; rollo, p. 498.
[61] 428 Phil. 878, March 12, 2002.
[62] Id., p. 892.
[63] The debt was allegedly satisfied through the levy and sale of respondent’s Toyota Land Cruiser and two parcels of land.  Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 18; rollo, p. 498.
[64] See Rico v. People, 392 SCRA 61, 74, November 18, 2002; Caras v. Court of Appeals, 418 Phil. 655, 668, October 2, 2001.
[65] See Seares v. Salazar, 345 SCRA 308, 313, November 22, 2000.
[66] De Joya v. Jail Warden of Batangas City, supra, p. 644 (citing Lozano v. Martinez, 230 Phil. 406, 424, December 18, 1986).


G.R. No. L-492 June 28, 1946

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-492  June 28, 1946 TEODORO CANTOS (TEODORO TATISHI),  petitio...