G.R. No. L-63915
December 29, 1986
LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA,
ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA,
in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in
his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE
LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
CRUZ, J.:
Due process was
invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by
law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it
was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed
the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the
dispositive portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court
hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
The petitioners are
now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of
that decision. 1Specifically, they ask the following
questions:
1. What is meant by
"law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
2. Must a distinction
be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?
3. What is meant by
"publication"?
4. Where is the
publication to be made?
5. When is the
publication to be made?
Resolving their own
doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between
laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means
complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the
Official Gazette. 2
In the Comment 3 required
of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a request
for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits,
that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the
Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not always
imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the
Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in
only by three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a
Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the
February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a
Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the
Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for the
internal administration of a government agency or for particular persons did
not have to be 'Published; that publication when necessary must be in full and
in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration
was not binding because it was not supported by eight members of this
Court. 5
The subject of
contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
ART. 2. Laws shall
take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code
shall take effect one year after such publication.
After a careful study
of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original
petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold,
that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date
of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot
in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without
its previous publication.
Publication is
indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide
that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example,
as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the
original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did
not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official
Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did
not apply because it was "otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to
say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason. is that such omission would offend due process insofar
as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern
the legislature could validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon
its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably
short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of
it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a
failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence,
Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One
can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must
also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to
operate.
We note at this point
the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course
presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any
legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6
of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among
others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.
The term "laws"
should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are
some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting
citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who
was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law
does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly
to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which
any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he
is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as anultra vires act of the legislature. To be
valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be
directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and t
to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore
that all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which
shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date
is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule
are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by
the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative
rules and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce
or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative
regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of
instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.
Accordingly, even the
charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a
portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of
that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say,
those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from
certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary
Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill
in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
enforce.
However, no
publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of
Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the
rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or
workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically,
municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government
Code.
We agree that
publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is
to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by
the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the
title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary
Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of
the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not
even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the
General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of
general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos
administration. 7 The evident purpose was to
withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
Coming now to the
original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for
publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that six
others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as the people were
sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his
vote 10 and another merely acknowledged the need
for due publication without indicating where it should be made. 11 It
is therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a
clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by
the necessary vote.
There is much to be
said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette,
considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly,
newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of
communicating, the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily
available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly. The trouble,
though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized
by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of
the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we
have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet been
published.
At any rate, this
Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or
modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function
belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law
as conceived and approved by the political departments of the government in
accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but
to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws
must be made in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a requirement for
their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different
period provided by the legislature.
We also hold that the
publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give
effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of
course, although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered
unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause
its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to
examine at this time.
Finally, the claim of
the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an
advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further
comment.
The days of the
secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open
society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and
available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to
remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government
authority emanating from them.
Although they have
delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the
work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights,
through their freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they
cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.
Laws must come out in
the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a
valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to
the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry
or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is
hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their
approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the
Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their
publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance
with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J.,
Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNAN, J., concurring:
While concurring in
the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani
A. Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of the
defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the insidious manner
by which the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective thousands
of decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the
law-making power which traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and
abused to satisfy the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it
happened in the past regime. Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to
witness the sad spectacle of two presidential decrees bearing the same number,
although covering two different subject matters. In point is the case of two
presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting
Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon the then President's nephew and the
other imposing a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with airconditioner. This
was further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980
granting Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey Moore and Dennis
George Still
The categorical
statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may be made
effective seeks prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same
time, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process and to
information on matters of public concern.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
I agree entirely with
the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz.
At the same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of
what the Court is saying.
A statute which by
its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval
thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon
publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the
Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting
literally to come into effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and
without need of publication. For so to interpret such statute would be to
collide with the constitutional obstacle posed by the due process clause. The
enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to and unknowable by those
subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a common tool of
tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom
a negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a
government and its people.
At the same time, it
is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official
Gazette, as distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of general
circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional
command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is
supported and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section
35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette
as the prescribed medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of
the Civil Code could, without creating a constitutional problem, be amended by
a subsequent statute providing, for instance, for publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country. Until
such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must
be obeyed and publication effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other
medium.
Separate Opinions
FERNAN, J., concurring:
While concurring in
the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani
A. Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of the
defunct Batasang Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the insidious manner
by which the previous dispensation had promulgated and made effective thousands
of decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc. Never has the
law-making power which traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and
abused to satisfy the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it
happened in the past regime. Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to
witness the sad spectacle of two presidential decrees bearing the same number,
although covering two different subject matters. In point is the case of two
presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting
Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon the then President's nephew and the
other imposing a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with airconditioner. This
was further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980
granting Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey Moore and Dennis
George Still
The categorical
statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may be made
effective seeks prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same
time, ensures to the people their constitutional right to due process and to
information on matters of public concern.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
I agree entirely with
the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz.
At the same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of
what the Court is saying.
A statute which by
its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval
thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon
publication thereof in the Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the
Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded as purporting
literally to come into effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and
without need of publication. For so to interpret such statute would be to
collide with the constitutional obstacle posed by the due process clause. The
enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to and unknowable by those
subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a common tool of
tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom
a negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a
government and its people.
At the same time, it
is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official
Gazette, as distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of general
circulation, is embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional
command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is
supported and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section
35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette
as the prescribed medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of
the Civil Code could, without creating a constitutional problem, be amended by
a subsequent statute providing, for instance, for publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country. Until
such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must
be obeyed and publication effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other
medium.
Footnotes
1 Rollo pp. 242-250.
2 Ibid, pp.
244-248.
3 Id, pp.
271-280.
4 Id, pp.
288-299.
5 Id, pp.
320-322.
6 136 SCRA 27,46.
7 Rollo, p. 24,6.
8 Justices Venicio
Escolin (ponente), Claudio Teehankee. Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, and Lorenzo
Relova.
9 Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando and Justices Felix V. Makasiar, Vicente Abad-Santos, Efren
1. Plana Serafin P. Cuevas. and Nestor B. Alampay.
10 Justice Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr.
11 Justice B. S. de
la Fuente.
Walang komento:
Mag-post ng isang Komento