[G.R. Nos. 159418-19. December 10, 2003]
NORMA DE JOYA, petitioner,
vs. THE JAIL WARDEN OF BATANGAS CITY AND HON. RUBEN A. GALVEZ AS PRESIDING
JUDGE OF BATANGAS CITY MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, BRANCH I, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus filed by Norma de Joya praying for her release from the
Batangas City Jail on the claim that her detention was illegal.
The Antecedents
The petitioner was charged separately with
violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Municipal Trial Court In Cities
in Batangas City. The docket numbers and accusatory portion of each of
the Informations reads:
Criminal Case No. 25484
That on or about September 28, 1994 at Batangas City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, well-knowing that she does not have funds in or credit
with the Solid Bank, Batangas Branch, Batangas City, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously draw, make and issue to Flor Catapang de
Tenorio, Solid Bank Check No. 040297 postdated to October 28, 1994 in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency, to apply on account or for value, but when said check was presented
for full payment with the drawee bank within a period of ninety (90) days from
the date of the check, the same was dishonored by the drawee bank on the ground
‘account closed,’ which in effect is even more than a dishonor for
insufficiency of funds, and despite notice of dishonor and demands made upon
her to make good her check by making proper arrangement with the drawee bank or
pay her obligation in full directly to Flor Catapang de Tenorio, accused failed
and refused to do so, which acts constitute a clear violation of the aforecited
law, to the damage and prejudice of transaction in commercial documents in
general and of Flor Catapang de Tenorio in particular in the aforementioned
amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
…
Criminal Case No. 25773
That on or about October 17, 1994 at Batangas City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, well-knowing that she does not have fund in or credit with
the Security Bank and Trust Company, Batangas Branch, Batangas City, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously draw, make and issue to
Resurreccion T. Castillo, Security Bank and Trust Company Check No. 038111
postdated to October 24, 1994 in the amount of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P225,000.00), Philippine Currency, to apply on account or for
value, but when said check was presented for full payment with the drawee bank
within a period of ninety (90) days from the date of the check, the same was
dishonored by the drawee bank on the ground of ‘account closed,’ which in
effect is even more than a dishonor for insufficiency of funds, and despite
notice of dishonor and demands made upon her to make good her check by making
proper arrangement with the drawee bank or pay her obligation in full directly
to Resurreccion T. Castillo, accused failed and refused to do so, which acts
constitute a clear violation of the aforecited law, to the damage and prejudice
of transaction in commercial documents in general and of Resurreccion T.
Castillo in particular in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
When arraigned in both cases, the petitioner,
assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. While trial was going on, the
petitioner jumped bail. No evidence was thereby adduced in her defense in
any of the two cases.
On December 14, 1995, the trial court
promulgated its decision in Criminal Case No. 25484. The petitioner and
her counsel failed to appear despite due notice. The decretal portion of the
decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Norma de Joya
guilty of the crime of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and hereby sentences
said accused to suffer an imprisonment of one (1) year and to indemnify the
offended party, Flor Catapang Tenorio, in the sum of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND
(P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.
SO ORDERED.[3]
On March 21, 1997, the decision in Criminal
Case No. 25773 was likewise promulgated in absentia. The
decretal portion of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Prosecution having satisfactorily established
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, this Court hereby sentences
herein-accused Norma de Joya of imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR and to pay
complainant Resurreccion Castillo of the amount of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE
THOUSAND (P225,000.00) PESOS by way of damages.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The petitioner remained at large and no
appeal was filed from any of the said decisions. In the meantime, the
Court issued Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 on November 21,
2000 enjoining all courts and judges concerned to take notice of the ruling and
policy of the Court enunciated in Vaca v. Court of Appeals[5] and Lim v. People[6] with regard to the
imposition of the penalty for violations of B.P. Blg. 22.
After five years, the petitioner was finally
arrested while she was applying for an NBI clearance. She was forthwith
detained at the Batangas City Jail on December 3, 2002. On July 28, 2003,
the petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Municipal Trial Court of
Batangas City asking the court to apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 retroactively
pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code and to order her release from
detention. The public prosecutor opposed the motion. In an Order
dated August 15, 2003, the trial court denied the motion on three grounds: (a)
its decision convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 had long
become final and executory; hence, could no longer be amended to change the
penalty imposed therein; (b) the SC Circular should be applied prospectively;
and (c) the SC Circular did not amend B.P. Blg. 22, a substantive law, but
merely encourages trial court judges to have a uniform imposition of fine.
Hence, the petition at bar.
The petitioner posits that SC Admin. Circular
No. 12-2000 deleted the penalty of imprisonment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
and allows only the imposition of a fine. The trial court was mandated to
apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 retroactively conformably with Article 22
of the Revised Penal Code citing the ruling of this Court in United
States v. Pacrose.[7] The petitioner prays that
the Court declare her detention illegal and order her release from the Batangas
City Jail.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
opposed the petition contending that:
1)
THE TWO (2) JUDGMENTS OF CONVICTION AGAINST THE PETITIONER HAD LONG ATTAINED
FINALITY AND COULD NO LONGER BE MODIFIED.
2)
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 12-2000 AS MODIFIED BY ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO.
13-2001 DID NOT DELETE THE PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT IN BP 22 CASES.[8]
The OSG cited the ruling of this Court
in Abarquez v. Court of Appeals.[9]
The petition has no merit.
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, provides that the writ of habeas corpus is not
allowed if the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody
of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record:
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or
discharged authorized. – If it appears that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record,
and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment; or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or
order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge
of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In this case, the petitioner was arrested and
detained pursuant to the final judgment of the Municipal Trial Court of
Batangas City, convicting her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Irrefragably
then, the petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.
Petitioner’s reliance of our ruling in Ordonez v. Vinarao[10] that a convicted person is
entitled to benefit from the reduction of penalty introduced by the new law,
citing People v. Simon,[11] is misplaced. Thus,
her plea that as provided for in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, SC
Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as modified by SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001
should benefit her has no basis.
First. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000
is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is not
applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the
date of its effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final judgment.
Second. As explained by the Court in SC
Admin. Circular No. 13-2001, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely lays down a
rule of preference in the application of the penalties for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative
intent behind the law. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely urges the
courts to take into account not only the purpose of the law but also the
circumstances of the accused – whether he acted in good faith or on a clear
mistake of fact without taint of negligence – and such other circumstance which
the trial court or the appellate court believes relevant to the penalty to be
imposed. The Court thus emphasized that:
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative
Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty,
but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties
provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.
The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose
the possibility of imprisonment for violators of B.P. Blg. 22. Neither
does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes
a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22
such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly
indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the
imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate
penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances
warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge.
Should the Judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty,
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.
It is, therefore, understood that:
1.
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an
alternative penalty for violations of B.P. Blg. 22;
2.
The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into
consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the
imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice or whether
forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the
offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the
imperatives of justice;
3.
Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there
is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on
subsidiary imprisonment.[12]
B.P. Blg. 22 provides for alternative
penalties of fine or imprisonment or both fine and imprisonment as follows:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient
funds. – Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply
on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by
the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty
days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more
than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed two
hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of
the court.[13]
The courts are given the discretion to choose
whether to impose a single penalty or conjunctive penalties; that is, whether
to impose a penalty of fine, or a penalty of imprisonment only, or a penalty of
both fine and imprisonment.
In providing for alternative penalties in
B.P. Blg. 22, Congress took into account the principal objectives of the law,
namely, the prohibition on the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. The practice is prohibited by law because of its deleterious
effects on public interest. The effects of the increase of worthless
checks transcend the private interest of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interest of the community at large. The
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an
injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation multiplied a thousand-fold can very well
pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The law
punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against
public order.[14]
However, in imposing penalties for crimes,
the courts must bear in mind that Philippine penal law is based on the Spanish
penal code and has adopted features of the positivist theory of
criminal law. The positivist theory states that the basis for criminal liability
is the sum total of the social and economic phenomena to which the offense is
expressed. The adoption of the aspects of the theory is exemplified by
the indeterminate sentence law, Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code (impossible crime), Article 68 and Articles 11 to 14, not to mention
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code (penalties for heinous and quasi-heinous
crimes). Philippine penal law looks at the convict as a member of
society. Among the important factors to be considered in determining the
penalty to be imposed on him are (1) his relationship towards his dependents,
family and their relationship with him; and (2) his relationship towards
society at large and the State. The State is concerned not only in the
imperative necessity of protecting the social organization against the criminal
acts of destructive individuals but also in redeeming the individual for
economic usefulness and other social ends.[15] The purpose of penalties is
to secure justice. The penalties imposed must not only be retributive but
must also be reformative, to give the convict an opportunity to live a new life
and rejoin society as a productive and civic-spirited member of the
community. The court has to consider not only the primary elements of
punishment, namely, the moral responsibility of the convict, the relation of
the convict to the private complainant, the intention of the convict, the
temptation to the act or the excuse for the crime – was it done by a rich man
in the insolence of his wealth or by a poor man in the extremity of his
need? The court must also take into account the secondary elements of
punishment, namely, the reformation of the offender, the prevention of further
offenses by the offender, the repression of offenses in others.[16] As Rousseau said, crimes
can be thoroughly repressed only by a system of penalties which, from the
benignity they breathe, serve rather than to soften than to inflame those on
whom they are imposed.[17] There is also merit in the
view that punishment inflicted beyond the merit of the offense is so much
punishment of innocence.[18]
In this case, even if the Court applies SC
Admin. Circular No. 12-2000, as revised, retroactively, the petition must
nevertheless be dismissed. The petitioner did not offer any evidence
during trial. The judgment of the court became final and executory upon
her failure to appeal therefrom. Worse, the petitioner remained at large
for five long years. Were it not for her attempt to secure an NBI
clearance, she would have been able to elude the long arm of the law.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing,
Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
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